DMA vs EU competition law gatekeeper rules and antitrust enforcement compared
The DMA is an ex ante rulebook for designated gatekeepers and their listed core platform services; separately assesses restrictive agreements, abuse of dominance, and other market conduct.
This page helps separate Article 5, 6, and 7 implementation duties from competition-law assessment work, then preserve the Article 11 evidence, market analysis, authority correspondence, and penalty exposure for each track.
The DMA does not replace . A gatekeeper must comply with the DMA duties attached to each designated core platform service without a separate finding of dominance, market definition, anticompetitive agreement, or abuse. Article 101 TFEU separately prohibits agreements and concerted practices that affect trade between Member States and restrict competition, subject to Article 101(3). Article 102 separately prohibits abuse of a that may affect trade between Member States; dominance itself is not prohibited. The same conduct can engage both tracks, and merger control remains a third, separate analysis.
Side-by-side comparison
DMA vs EU competition law: operational differences for platform teams
This comparison helps decide whether the work is a DMA gatekeeper obligation, a competition-law assessment, or a coordinated pair of separate records.
Ex ante obligations for designated gatekeepers and the core platform services listed in their designation decisions.
Second framework
EU competition law
Article 101 governs restrictive agreements and coordination; Article 102 governs abuse by dominant undertakings. Merger control and national competition rules are related but separate tracks.
DMA vs EU competition law: operational differences for platform teams
Article 1 and the recitals support the DMA purpose and ex ante gatekeeper model.
Article 101 applies to agreements, association decisions, and concerted practices that may affect trade between Member States and restrict competition by object or effect. Article 102 applies when a dominant undertaking abuses that position and the conduct may affect trade between Member States. Neither test depends on DMA designation.
Gatekeeper designation for listed core platform services. Article 3 presumptions use turnover or market-value, Member State presence, active end-user, active business-user, and repeated-threshold criteria, with a notification route when the thresholds are met.
Article 3 supports designation criteria, notification, and gatekeeper presumption thresholds.
For Article 101, identify the parties, agreement or coordination, relevant trade and market context, restriction by object or effect, and any Article 101(3) efficiency claim. For Article 102, define the relevant market, assess dominance, identify the alleged abuse, effects and objective justification. Run merger control separately for a concentration.
Supports separate Article 101 agreement and coordination analysis, Article 101(3) assessment, and Article 102 dominance and abuse analysis.
Open the DMA workstream only after confirming gatekeeper and CPS scope; open the competition-law workstream when the market-conduct facts require antitrust analysis.
Articles 5, 6, and 7 impose concrete duties on gatekeepers, including data-combination limits, anti-steering rules, user choice, app-store and default-setting obligations, ranking neutrality, interoperability, portability, and business-user data access.
Articles 5, 6, and 7 provide the listed DMA duties used for the obligation comparison.
Competition law does not provide the DMA's pre-set product checklist. Article 101 requires an agreement or coordination and a restriction analysis; Article 102 requires dominance and abuse. Similar conduct, such as tying, self-preferencing, discriminatory access, or restrictions on business users, can produce different conclusions under the two provisions.
Supports the distinct Article 101 and Article 102 elements and the need for case-specific analysis.
Turn DMA duties into engineering, product, data, commercial, and reporting controls; keep competition-law analysis as a separate facts-and-effects assessment.
Supports the Article 11 evidence expectations for detailed measures, supporting data, internal documents, machine-readable reports, and annual updates.
Article 101 evidence can include agreements, communications, meeting records, pricing or strategy documents, competitive effects, and efficiency substantiation. Article 102 evidence can include market definition, market shares and entry conditions, internal strategy, conduct and affected counterparties, effects, objective justification, and remedy analysis. Preserve authority, court, and private-claim records separately.
Article 11 supplies the six-month reporting obligation and annual update requirement.
Articles 101 and 102 do not create a general annual report equivalent to DMA Article 11. Review timing follows the conduct, agreement lifecycle, complaint, investigation, limitation rules, commitment or remedy, litigation, or transaction timetable.
DMA non-compliance can lead to Commission non-compliance decisions, fines up to 10% of total worldwide turnover, up to 20% for repeated same or similar Article 5/6/7 infringements for the same CPS within the specified period, and periodic penalty payments up to 5% of average daily worldwide turnover per day.
Articles 29, 30, and 31 support the DMA enforcement route, fine caps, repeat-infringement rule, and periodic penalty payment cap.
Under Regulation 1/2003, the Commission may order an infringement to end, impose proportionate behavioural or structural remedies, accept commitments, order interim measures, and impose fines up to 10% of total turnover in the preceding business year for intentional or negligent Article 101 or 102 infringements. National and private-enforcement consequences follow their own legal bases.
Articles 7 to 9 and 23 support infringement decisions, remedies, interim measures, commitments, and the competition-law fine cap.
Write separate penalty exposure lines: DMA Article 29-31 exposure for gatekeeper non-compliance, and competition-law exposure for the specific market-conduct matter.
DMA records can share underlying product facts with competition-law files, especially for ranking, access, data, interoperability, steering, and business-user treatment.
Article 38 supports cooperation and coordination between the Commission and national competition authorities while preserving separate enforcement roles.
Competition-law files can reuse the same product facts, but must still state the market-conduct theory, factual record, effects, defences, procedural posture, and remedy path.
Article 1 preserves competition-law application alongside the DMA, supporting separate conclusions where facts overlap.
Use one facts repository if helpful, but keep two conclusions: DMA compliance status by obligation and CPS, and competition-law assessment by conduct and market issue.
Article 1 and the recitals support the DMA purpose and ex ante gatekeeper model.
EU competition law
Article 101 applies to agreements, association decisions, and concerted practices that may affect trade between Member States and restrict competition by object or effect. Article 102 applies when a dominant undertaking abuses that position and the conduct may affect trade between Member States. Neither test depends on DMA designation.
Commission overview confirms the DMA contains rules for designation and obligations imposed on gatekeepers.
Designation and competition-law analysis
Digital Markets Act
Gatekeeper designation for listed core platform services. Article 3 presumptions use turnover or market-value, Member State presence, active end-user, active business-user, and repeated-threshold criteria, with a notification route when the thresholds are met.
Article 3 supports designation criteria, notification, and gatekeeper presumption thresholds.
EU competition law
For Article 101, identify the parties, agreement or coordination, relevant trade and market context, restriction by object or effect, and any Article 101(3) efficiency claim. For Article 102, define the relevant market, assess dominance, identify the alleged abuse, effects and objective justification. Run merger control separately for a concentration.
Supports separate Article 101 agreement and coordination analysis, Article 101(3) assessment, and Article 102 dominance and abuse analysis.
Operational implication
Open the DMA workstream only after confirming gatekeeper and CPS scope; open the competition-law workstream when the market-conduct facts require antitrust analysis.
Commission page provides the current public designation context for gatekeepers and core platform services.
Conduct requirements and legal tests
Digital Markets Act
Articles 5, 6, and 7 impose concrete duties on gatekeepers, including data-combination limits, anti-steering rules, user choice, app-store and default-setting obligations, ranking neutrality, interoperability, portability, and business-user data access.
Articles 5, 6, and 7 provide the listed DMA duties used for the obligation comparison.
EU competition law
Competition law does not provide the DMA's pre-set product checklist. Article 101 requires an agreement or coordination and a restriction analysis; Article 102 requires dominance and abuse. Similar conduct, such as tying, self-preferencing, discriminatory access, or restrictions on business users, can produce different conclusions under the two provisions.
Supports the distinct Article 101 and Article 102 elements and the need for case-specific analysis.
Operational implication
Turn DMA duties into engineering, product, data, commercial, and reporting controls; keep competition-law analysis as a separate facts-and-effects assessment.
Supports the Article 11 evidence expectations for detailed measures, supporting data, internal documents, machine-readable reports, and annual updates.
EU competition law
Article 101 evidence can include agreements, communications, meeting records, pricing or strategy documents, competitive effects, and efficiency substantiation. Article 102 evidence can include market definition, market shares and entry conditions, internal strategy, conduct and affected counterparties, effects, objective justification, and remedy analysis. Preserve authority, court, and private-claim records separately.
Article 11 supplies the six-month reporting obligation and annual update requirement.
EU competition law
Articles 101 and 102 do not create a general annual report equivalent to DMA Article 11. Review timing follows the conduct, agreement lifecycle, complaint, investigation, limitation rules, commitment or remedy, litigation, or transaction timetable.
Commission template reinforces annual updates and comparison against previous report versions.
Enforcement and penalties
Digital Markets Act
DMA non-compliance can lead to Commission non-compliance decisions, fines up to 10% of total worldwide turnover, up to 20% for repeated same or similar Article 5/6/7 infringements for the same CPS within the specified period, and periodic penalty payments up to 5% of average daily worldwide turnover per day.
Articles 29, 30, and 31 support the DMA enforcement route, fine caps, repeat-infringement rule, and periodic penalty payment cap.
EU competition law
Under Regulation 1/2003, the Commission may order an infringement to end, impose proportionate behavioural or structural remedies, accept commitments, order interim measures, and impose fines up to 10% of total turnover in the preceding business year for intentional or negligent Article 101 or 102 infringements. National and private-enforcement consequences follow their own legal bases.
Articles 7 to 9 and 23 support infringement decisions, remedies, interim measures, commitments, and the competition-law fine cap.
Operational implication
Write separate penalty exposure lines: DMA Article 29-31 exposure for gatekeeper non-compliance, and competition-law exposure for the specific market-conduct matter.
DMA penalty mechanics are tied to DMA non-compliance decisions and should be separated from other competition-law exposure.
Shared facts, separate conclusions
Digital Markets Act
DMA records can share underlying product facts with competition-law files, especially for ranking, access, data, interoperability, steering, and business-user treatment.
Article 38 supports cooperation and coordination between the Commission and national competition authorities while preserving separate enforcement roles.
EU competition law
Competition-law files can reuse the same product facts, but must still state the market-conduct theory, factual record, effects, defences, procedural posture, and remedy path.
Article 1 preserves competition-law application alongside the DMA, supporting separate conclusions where facts overlap.
Operational implication
Use one facts repository if helpful, but keep two conclusions: DMA compliance status by obligation and CPS, and competition-law assessment by conduct and market issue.
Commission overview confirms the DMA contains rules for designation and obligations imposed on gatekeepers.
Practical decision rule
How should teams decide which track to open?
Open a DMA track when the actor is a designated gatekeeper, the service is a listed core platform service, and the change touches an Article 5, 6, or 7 duty or Article 11 evidence.
Open a competition-law track when the fact pattern concerns suspected restrictive agreement, abuse of dominance, merger-related concern, exclusionary access, discriminatory ranking, pricing, tying, refusal, complaint, or authority inquiry.
Open both tracks when a designated CPS change also raises market-conduct concerns; assign separate owners, sources, evidence folders, conclusions, and penalty exposure lines.
Close the review only after the DMA owner confirms Article 5/6/7 and Article 11 treatment, and competition counsel confirms the case-specific antitrust position or next procedural step.
Supports the decision rule for confirming Article 11 evidence by obligation and core platform service.
1
Section 1
What is the core legal difference?
The DMA starts with status and service scope. An undertaking is designated as a gatekeeper when it has significant internal-market impact, provides a core platform service that is an important gateway for business users to reach end users, and has an entrenched and durable position or is expected to have one. Article 3 also contains quantitative presumptions: EUR 7.5 billion annual Union turnover in each of the last three financial years or EUR 75 billion average market capitalisation or fair market value in the last financial year, the same core platform service in at least three Member States, at least 45 million monthly active end users in the Union, at least 10,000 yearly active business users in the Union, and repeated end-user and business-user thresholds over the last three financial years.
Competition-law analysis starts with the suspected conduct and the applicable rule. Article 101 asks whether an agreement, decision by an association, or concerted practice may affect trade between Member States and has the object or effect of restricting competition, then whether Article 101(3)'s cumulative exemption conditions are met. Article 102 asks whether an undertaking is dominant in the internal market or a substantial part of it and has abused that position in a way that may affect trade between Member States. The DMA itself preserves both provisions, so the same platform change can require a DMA obligation check and a separate antitrust assessment.
Use the DMA track when the actor is a designated gatekeeper and the service is listed in the designation decision as a core platform service.
Use the Article 101 track for agreements or coordination, the Article 102 track for possible abuse of dominance, and the merger-control track for a concentration. Do not collapse those competition-law tests into one generic antitrust label.
For an , record evidence for all four cumulative conditions: efficiency gains, a fair share of the benefit for consumers, restrictions that are indispensable to those gains, and no elimination of competition for a substantial part of the products concerned.
Keep the two tracks separate when writing advice, assigning owners, collecting evidence, and describing penalties.
Supports the DMA designation criteria, the Article 1 relationship with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and the recital contrast between ex ante DMA obligations and ex post competition-law enforcement.
Confirms that the DMA contains the main rules for gatekeeper designation and obligations, with a procedural implementing regulation for DMA proceedings.
Binding treaty source for the agreement, effect-on-trade, restriction, Article 101(3) exemption, dominance, abuse, and effect-on-trade elements.
2
Section 2
How do Article 5, 6, and 7 duties change the compliance work?
DMA compliance is obligation-by-obligation. Article 5 includes directly applicable prohibitions and duties such as limits on cross-service personal-data combination without valid consent, anti-steering restrictions, business-user communication rights, access to purchased content, complaint rights, and advertising transparency information. Article 6 adds obligations that may be further specified, including uninstall and default-setting choice, third-party app and app-store access, ranking neutrality, interoperability with operating-system or virtual-assistant features, advertising measurement access, end-user portability, and business-user data access.
Article 7 is narrower and more technical: it applies to designated number-independent interpersonal communications services and requires interoperability of basic functionalities through technical interfaces or similar solutions upon request, free of charge. Those DMA obligations should become product controls, engineering requirements, request-handling records, and testing evidence. Competition-law work may use some of the same product facts, but it does not become an Article 5/6/7 control matrix unless the DMA scope conditions are met.
For each listed core platform service, map the applicable Article 5, 6, and 7 paragraphs to product areas, data flows, user journeys, request channels, and control owners.
For Article 6(7), 6(9), and 6(10), preserve request logs and API or tool evidence for interoperability, portability, and data-access routes made available to businesses or users.
For competition-law matters, preserve market definition, agreement files, dominance analysis, effects evidence, efficiencies, remedy discussions, and authority correspondence separately from the DMA control matrix.
Lists business-facing resources for Article 6(7) interoperability, Article 6(9) portability, and Article 6(10) data-access requests.
3
Section 3
What evidence belongs in the Article 11 report?
Article 11 requires every gatekeeper to provide the Commission, within six months after designation, a detailed and transparent compliance report describing measures implemented for Articles 5, 6, and 7, plus a non-confidential summary. The gatekeeper must update the report and summary at least annually. The Commission template also expects explanations by core platform service and obligation, supporting data and internal documents, information on measures before or after designation, and machine-readable report materials.
A DMA Article 11 evidence pack should show the implemented measures and effective compliance for the listed core-platform-service obligations. A competition-law file should contain the facts needed for the particular agreement, dominance, merger, complaint, investigation, commitment, or remedy question.
Competition-law evidence: market facts, internal commercial records, agreement or pricing materials, ranking and access decisions, economic analysis, complaint materials, remedies or commitments, and communications with competition authorities or courts.
Do not use an Article 11 report as the only record for an antitrust risk assessment; it is designed to show DMA compliance measures, not to replace case-specific competition-law analysis.
Article 11 is the binding reporting obligation for gatekeepers after designation and for annual report updates.
4
Section 4
How do enforcement and penalties differ?
For the DMA, the Commission is the central enforcement authority. A non-compliance decision can address failure to comply with Articles 5, 6, or 7, Commission-specified measures, remedies, interim measures, or binding commitments. The DMA fine cap is up to 10% of total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year for specified non-compliance, and up to 20% for the same or similar Article 5, 6, or 7 infringement in relation to the same core platform service after a non-compliance decision in the preceding eight years. Periodic penalty payments can reach up to 5% of average daily worldwide turnover per day for listed failures.
Articles 101 and 102 are enforced by the Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts under Regulation 1/2003 and national procedural rules. The Commission can require an infringement to end, impose structural or behavioural remedies proportionate to the infringement, accept commitments without finding an infringement, order interim measures, and fine undertakings up to 10% of total turnover in the preceding business year for intentional or negligent substantive infringements. Those are competition-law powers, not DMA sanctions, even where a percentage cap looks similar.
Escalate DMA issues when a gatekeeper service may breach Article 5, 6, or 7, when Article 11 evidence is incomplete, or when Commission requests, proceedings, or non-compliance findings arise.
Escalate competition-law issues when there is suspected restrictive coordination, possible abuse by a dominant undertaking, a concentration requiring merger review, a complaint, dawn raid or information request, authority correspondence, or private litigation.
When both tracks apply, list the DMA penalty exposure separately from competition-law enforcement exposure and avoid describing one as a substitute for the other.
Primary procedural source for Commission and national enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, infringement decisions, interim measures, commitments, remedies, investigations, and competition-law fines.
Recommended next step
Build a cited DMA and antitrust evidence split
Use the cited sources listed here to verify obligations and the supporting evidence requirements.
Primary legal source for DMA scope, gatekeeper designation, Articles 5 to 7 obligations, Article 11 reports, Article 1 relationship with competition law, and Articles 29 to 31 penalties.
Supports the DMA designation criteria, the Article 1 relationship with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and the recital contrast between ex ante DMA obligations and ex post competition-law enforcement.
Provides the binding Article 5, Article 6, and Article 7 obligations used to distinguish DMA implementation work from competition-law case analysis.
Show 13 more
Article 11 is the binding reporting obligation for gatekeepers after designation and for annual report updates.
Articles 29, 30, and 31 support the DMA non-compliance decision route, fine caps, repeat-infringement cap, and periodic penalty payment cap.
Article 1 and the recitals support the DMA purpose and ex ante gatekeeper model.
Article 3 supports designation criteria, notification, and gatekeeper presumption thresholds.
Articles 5, 6, and 7 provide the listed DMA duties used for the obligation comparison.
Article 11 supplies the six-month reporting obligation and annual update requirement.
The preserved competition-law route remains separate from the DMA Article 11 reporting obligation.
Articles 29, 30, and 31 support the DMA enforcement route, fine caps, repeat-infringement rule, and periodic penalty payment cap.
DMA penalty mechanics are tied to DMA non-compliance decisions and should be separated from other competition-law exposure.
Article 38 supports cooperation and coordination between the Commission and national competition authorities while preserving separate enforcement roles.
Article 1 preserves competition-law application alongside the DMA, supporting separate conclusions where facts overlap.
Article 3 requires a designation decision listing the relevant core platform services.
Supports separate DMA scoping, Article 5 to 7 obligations, Article 11 reporting, and preserved competition-law application.
Primary procedural source for public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102, including Commission and national authority powers, commitments, remedies, investigations, and fines.
Primary procedural source for Commission and national enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, infringement decisions, interim measures, commitments, remedies, investigations, and competition-law fines.
Articles 7 to 9 and 23 support infringement decisions, remedies, interim measures, commitments, and the competition-law fine cap.
Commission overview for DMA legislation, the procedural implementing regulation, Form GD, notices, and templates used in DMA implementation.
Confirms that the DMA contains the main rules for gatekeeper designation and obligations, with a procedural implementing regulation for DMA proceedings.
Commission overview confirms the DMA contains rules for designation and obligations imposed on gatekeepers.