| Scope boundary | Creates harmonised ex ante rules for contestable and fair digital markets where gatekeepers are present. | Article 101 applies to agreements, association decisions, and concerted practices that may affect trade between Member States and restrict competition by object or effect. Article 102 applies when a dominant undertaking abuses that position and the conduct may affect trade between Member States. Neither test depends on DMA designation. | Do not wait for an antitrust infringement theory before implementing DMA duties for a designated gatekeeper service. |
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| Covered actors | Gatekeeper designation for listed core platform services. Article 3 presumptions use turnover or market-value, Member State presence, active end-user, active business-user, and repeated-threshold criteria, with a notification route when the thresholds are met. | For Article 101, identify the parties, agreement or coordination, relevant trade and market context, restriction by object or effect, and any Article 101(3) efficiency claim. For Article 102, define the relevant market, assess dominance, identify the alleged abuse, effects and objective justification. Run merger control separately for a concentration. | Open the DMA workstream only after confirming gatekeeper and CPS scope; open the competition-law workstream when the market-conduct facts require antitrust analysis. |
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| Trigger | Articles 5, 6, and 7 impose concrete duties on gatekeepers, including data-combination limits, anti-steering rules, user choice, app-store and default-setting obligations, ranking neutrality, interoperability, portability, and business-user data access. | Competition law does not provide the DMA's pre-set product checklist. Article 101 requires an agreement or coordination and a restriction analysis; Article 102 requires dominance and abuse. Similar conduct, such as tying, self-preferencing, discriminatory access, or restrictions on business users, can produce different conclusions under the two provisions. | Turn DMA duties into engineering, product, data, commercial, and reporting controls; keep competition-law analysis as a separate facts-and-effects assessment. |
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| Core obligations | Designation decision, CPS inventory, Article 5/6/7 matrix, implementation measures, testing, user-flow evidence, request logs, raw data, annual Article 11 report updates, and non-confidential summary. | Article 101 evidence can include agreements, communications, meeting records, pricing or strategy documents, competitive effects, and efficiency substantiation. Article 102 evidence can include market definition, market shares and entry conditions, internal strategy, conduct and affected counterparties, effects, objective justification, and remedy analysis. Preserve authority, court, and private-claim records separately. | Evidence can overlap, but label it by legal purpose so Article 11 reporting material is not treated as a full antitrust case file. |
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| Review timing and records | Article 11 requires a compliance report and non-confidential summary within six months after designation, then updates at least annually. | Articles 101 and 102 do not create a general annual report equivalent to DMA Article 11. Review timing follows the conduct, agreement lifecycle, complaint, investigation, limitation rules, commitment or remedy, litigation, or transaction timetable. | Calendar Article 11 separately from competition-law matter deadlines and do not let annual DMA reporting become the only antitrust review trigger. |
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| Enforcement and penalties | DMA non-compliance can lead to Commission non-compliance decisions, fines up to 10% of total worldwide turnover, up to 20% for repeated same or similar Article 5/6/7 infringements for the same CPS within the specified period, and periodic penalty payments up to 5% of average daily worldwide turnover per day. | Under Regulation 1/2003, the Commission may order an infringement to end, impose proportionate behavioural or structural remedies, accept commitments, order interim measures, and impose fines up to 10% of total turnover in the preceding business year for intentional or negligent Article 101 or 102 infringements. National and private-enforcement consequences follow their own legal bases. | Write separate penalty exposure lines: DMA Article 29-31 exposure for gatekeeper non-compliance, and competition-law exposure for the specific market-conduct matter. |
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| Shared facts, separate conclusions | DMA records can share underlying product facts with competition-law files, especially for ranking, access, data, interoperability, steering, and business-user treatment. | Competition-law files can reuse the same product facts, but must still state the market-conduct theory, factual record, effects, defences, procedural posture, and remedy path. | Use one facts repository if helpful, but keep two conclusions: DMA compliance status by obligation and CPS, and competition-law assessment by conduct and market issue. |
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| Overlap and reuse | Shared facts can sit in one evidence repository, but the record should still separate DMA obligations from competition-law theories. | The same product change may be relevant to both regimes, yet each regime needs its own legal test, authority, and record of assessment. | Re-use facts once, then write two legal conclusions so the comparison stays informative instead of repetitive. |
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| Practical decision rule | Start with the designation decision and core platform service list to see whether the DMA applies. | Then test the conduct, agreements, dominance, or effects issue to see whether competition law also applies. | If both tests are satisfied, keep the DMA control plan and the antitrust assessment in separate workstreams and separate records. |
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