The DMA is an ex ante rulebook for designated gatekeepers and their listed core platform services; EU competition law remains case-by-case enforcement for agreements, dominance, and other market conduct.
Use this page to separate Article 5, 6, and 7 implementation duties from competition-law assessment work, then preserve the Article 11 evidence, market analysis, authority correspondence, and penalty exposure for each track.
Structured answer sets in this page tree.
Cited legal and guidance references.
The Digital Markets Act (DMA) does not supersede EU competition law. It adds up-front obligations for undertakings designated as gatekeepers for specific core platform services, while Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and related national competition rules continue to apply to case-specific conduct. The practical difference is that a designated gatekeeper must operationalise listed DMA duties even before an infringement case, while competition-law work still turns on the facts, market position, effects, evidence, procedure, and remedy in the individual matter. Timings in this page are source-linked; verify current legal source language before implementation decisions.
Use this comparison to decide whether the work is a DMA gatekeeper obligation, a competition-law assessment, or a coordinated pair of separate records.
Ex ante obligations for designated gatekeepers and the core platform services listed in their designation decisions.
Case-specific assessment and enforcement for agreements, dominance, merger-related issues, and market conduct under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and related rules.
| Dimension | Digital Markets Act | EU competition law | Operational implication |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope boundary | Creates harmonised ex ante rules for contestable and fair digital markets where gatekeepers are present. | Applies to particular conduct, agreements, dominance questions, and market effects; the DMA recitals describe this enforcement as ex post and case-by-case. | Do not wait for an antitrust infringement theory before implementing DMA duties for a designated gatekeeper service. |
| Covered actors | Gatekeeper designation for listed core platform services. Article 3 presumptions use turnover or market-value, Member State presence, active end-user, active business-user, and repeated-threshold criteria, with a notification route when the thresholds are met. | A suspected competition issue: agreement or concerted practice, dominance concern, exclusionary or exploitative conduct, merger-related issue, complaint, or authority investigation. | Open the DMA workstream only after confirming gatekeeper and CPS scope; open the competition-law workstream when the market-conduct facts require antitrust analysis. |
| Trigger | Articles 5, 6, and 7 impose concrete duties on gatekeepers, including data-combination limits, anti-steering rules, user choice, app-store and default-setting obligations, ranking neutrality, interoperability, portability, and business-user data access. | Competition law does not provide the same pre-set product checklist; it tests whether the specific conduct restricts competition or abuses dominance in the relevant circumstances. | Turn DMA duties into engineering, product, data, commercial, and reporting controls; keep competition-law analysis as a separate facts-and-effects assessment. |
| Core obligations | Designation decision, CPS inventory, Article 5/6/7 matrix, implementation measures, testing, user-flow evidence, request logs, raw data, annual Article 11 report updates, and non-confidential summary. | Market definition, internal strategy and commercial records, contracts, pricing or ranking evidence, economic analysis, complaint or investigation materials, commitments, remedies, and authority or court correspondence. | Evidence can overlap, but label it by legal purpose so Article 11 reporting material is not treated as a full antitrust case file. |
| Evidence record | Article 11 requires a compliance report and non-confidential summary within six months after designation, then updates at least annually. | No equivalent annual antitrust report is created by the DMA comparison; timing depends on the investigation, merger-control, complaint, commitment, remedy, court, or independent review process. | Calendar Article 11 separately from competition-law matter deadlines and do not let annual DMA reporting become the only antitrust review trigger. |
| Timing and deadlines | DMA non-compliance can lead to Commission non-compliance decisions, fines up to 10% of total worldwide turnover, up to 20% for repeated same or similar Article 5/6/7 infringements for the same CPS within the specified period, and periodic penalty payments up to 5% of average daily worldwide turnover per day. | Competition-law sanctions and remedies follow the applicable antitrust, merger, authority, court, or settlement route for the specific case and should not be described with DMA caps unless the DMA is actually engaged. | Write separate penalty exposure lines: DMA Article 29-31 exposure for gatekeeper non-compliance, and competition-law exposure for the specific market-conduct matter. |
| Enforcement | DMA records can share underlying product facts with competition-law files, especially for ranking, access, data, interoperability, steering, and business-user treatment. | Competition-law files can reuse the same product facts, but must still state the market-conduct theory, factual record, effects, defences, procedural posture, and remedy path. | Use one facts repository if helpful, but keep two conclusions: DMA compliance status by obligation and CPS, and competition-law assessment by conduct and market issue. |
| Overlap and reuse | Shared facts can sit in one evidence repository, but the file should still separate DMA obligations from competition-law theories. | The same product change may be relevant to both regimes, yet each regime needs its own legal test, authority, and record of assessment. | Re-use facts once, then write two legal conclusions so the comparison stays informative instead of repetitive. |
| Practical decision rule | Start with the designation decision and core platform service list to see whether the DMA applies. | Then test the conduct, agreements, dominance, or effects issue to see whether competition law also applies. | If both tests are satisfied, keep the DMA control plan and the antitrust assessment in separate workstreams and separate records. |
Creates harmonised ex ante rules for contestable and fair digital markets where gatekeepers are present.
Applies to particular conduct, agreements, dominance questions, and market effects; the DMA recitals describe this enforcement as ex post and case-by-case.
Do not wait for an antitrust infringement theory before implementing DMA duties for a designated gatekeeper service.
Gatekeeper designation for listed core platform services. Article 3 presumptions use turnover or market-value, Member State presence, active end-user, active business-user, and repeated-threshold criteria, with a notification route when the thresholds are met.
A suspected competition issue: agreement or concerted practice, dominance concern, exclusionary or exploitative conduct, merger-related issue, complaint, or authority investigation.
Open the DMA workstream only after confirming gatekeeper and CPS scope; open the competition-law workstream when the market-conduct facts require antitrust analysis.
Articles 5, 6, and 7 impose concrete duties on gatekeepers, including data-combination limits, anti-steering rules, user choice, app-store and default-setting obligations, ranking neutrality, interoperability, portability, and business-user data access.
Competition law does not provide the same pre-set product checklist; it tests whether the specific conduct restricts competition or abuses dominance in the relevant circumstances.
Turn DMA duties into engineering, product, data, commercial, and reporting controls; keep competition-law analysis as a separate facts-and-effects assessment.
Designation decision, CPS inventory, Article 5/6/7 matrix, implementation measures, testing, user-flow evidence, request logs, raw data, annual Article 11 report updates, and non-confidential summary.
Market definition, internal strategy and commercial records, contracts, pricing or ranking evidence, economic analysis, complaint or investigation materials, commitments, remedies, and authority or court correspondence.
Evidence can overlap, but label it by legal purpose so Article 11 reporting material is not treated as a full antitrust case file.
Article 11 requires a compliance report and non-confidential summary within six months after designation, then updates at least annually.
No equivalent annual antitrust report is created by the DMA comparison; timing depends on the investigation, merger-control, complaint, commitment, remedy, court, or independent review process.
Calendar Article 11 separately from competition-law matter deadlines and do not let annual DMA reporting become the only antitrust review trigger.
DMA non-compliance can lead to Commission non-compliance decisions, fines up to 10% of total worldwide turnover, up to 20% for repeated same or similar Article 5/6/7 infringements for the same CPS within the specified period, and periodic penalty payments up to 5% of average daily worldwide turnover per day.
Competition-law sanctions and remedies follow the applicable antitrust, merger, authority, court, or settlement route for the specific case and should not be described with DMA caps unless the DMA is actually engaged.
Write separate penalty exposure lines: DMA Article 29-31 exposure for gatekeeper non-compliance, and competition-law exposure for the specific market-conduct matter.
DMA records can share underlying product facts with competition-law files, especially for ranking, access, data, interoperability, steering, and business-user treatment.
Competition-law files can reuse the same product facts, but must still state the market-conduct theory, factual record, effects, defences, procedural posture, and remedy path.
Use one facts repository if helpful, but keep two conclusions: DMA compliance status by obligation and CPS, and competition-law assessment by conduct and market issue.
Shared facts can sit in one evidence repository, but the file should still separate DMA obligations from competition-law theories.
The same product change may be relevant to both regimes, yet each regime needs its own legal test, authority, and record of assessment.
Re-use facts once, then write two legal conclusions so the comparison stays informative instead of repetitive.
Start with the designation decision and core platform service list to see whether the DMA applies.
Then test the conduct, agreements, dominance, or effects issue to see whether competition law also applies.
If both tests are satisfied, keep the DMA control plan and the antitrust assessment in separate workstreams and separate records.
The DMA starts with status and service scope. An undertaking is designated as a gatekeeper when it has significant internal-market impact, provides a core platform service that is an important gateway for business users to reach end users, and has an entrenched and durable position or is expected to have one. Article 3 also contains quantitative presumptions: EUR 7.5 billion annual Union turnover in each of the last three financial years or EUR 75 billion average market capitalisation or fair market value in the last financial year, the same core platform service in at least three Member States, at least 45 million monthly active end users in the Union, at least 10,000 yearly active business users in the Union, and repeated end-user and business-user thresholds over the last three financial years.
Competition-law analysis starts with the suspected conduct. The DMA itself says Articles 101 and 102 TFEU still apply, and its recitals describe traditional competition-law enforcement as ex post, fact-intensive, and case-by-case. That is why the same platform change can need both a DMA obligation check and a separate antitrust assessment.
DMA compliance is obligation-by-obligation. Article 5 includes directly applicable prohibitions and duties such as limits on cross-service personal-data combination without valid consent, anti-steering restrictions, business-user communication rights, access to purchased content, complaint rights, and advertising transparency information. Article 6 adds obligations that may be further specified, including uninstall and default-setting choice, third-party app and app-store access, ranking neutrality, interoperability with operating-system or virtual-assistant features, advertising measurement access, end-user portability, and business-user data access.
Article 7 is narrower and more technical: it applies to designated number-independent interpersonal communications services and requires interoperability of basic functionalities through technical interfaces or similar solutions upon request, free of charge. Those DMA obligations should become product controls, engineering requirements, request-handling records, and testing evidence. Competition-law work may use some of the same product facts, but it does not become an Article 5/6/7 control matrix unless the DMA scope conditions are met.
Article 11 requires every gatekeeper to provide the Commission, within six months after designation, a detailed and transparent compliance report describing measures implemented for Articles 5, 6, and 7, plus a non-confidential summary. The gatekeeper must update the report and summary at least annually. The Commission template also expects explanations by core platform service and obligation, supporting data and internal documents, information on measures before or after designation, and machine-readable report materials.
That evidence is different from a competition-law case file. A DMA Article 11 evidence pack should prove implemented measures and effective compliance for the listed CPS obligations. A competition-law file should prove the facts needed for the particular agreement, dominance, merger, complaint, investigation, commitment, or remedy question.
For the DMA, the Commission is the central enforcement authority. A non-compliance decision can address failure to comply with Articles 5, 6, or 7, Commission-specified measures, remedies, interim measures, or binding commitments. The DMA fine cap is up to 10% of total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year for specified non-compliance, and up to 20% for the same or similar Article 5, 6, or 7 infringement in relation to the same core platform service after a non-compliance decision in the preceding eight years. Periodic penalty payments can reach up to 5% of average daily worldwide turnover per day for listed failures.
Competition-law enforcement can involve Commission, national authority, court, merger-control, complaint, commitment, remedy, or litigation procedures depending on the matter. Do not import DMA penalty caps into a competition-law memo unless the issue is actually DMA non-compliance; record the separate enforcement route and sanction basis for each track.
Use the cited sources listed here to verify obligations and the supporting evidence requirements.
Verify the following areas from the cited sources: gatekeeper status, core platform services, Articles 5 to 7, Article 11 reports, and DMA enforcement evidence.
Review where your platform work needs DMA controls, competition-law analysis, or both, and identify the evidence gaps before an authority request.
"Compliance Report"
"core platform services"
"designation of gatekeepers"
"Data access"
"Articles 5, 6 and 7"