Article 30 sets fine ceilings of 10%, 20% for a narrowly defined repeat infringement, and 1% for listed procedural failures. Article 31 separately permits daily payments of up to 5% of average daily turnover.
The percentages are maximums, not automatic tariffs. Use this guide to identify the correct category, turnover period, legal trigger, and supporting record.
Structured answer sets in this page tree.
Cited legal and guidance references.
Start a DMA penalty analysis by identifying the legal category. Article 30 fines punish intentional or negligent substantive or procedural failures and use total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year. Article 31 compel listed actions and use average daily worldwide turnover in that year. Cease-and-desist orders and Article 18 remedies are enforcement measures, not additional fine bands. The statutory percentages are ceilings; the Commission fixes any amount through a case-specific decision.
In a gatekeeper , Article 30 allows the Commission to impose a fine up to 10% of the gatekeeper's total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year. The Commission must find intentional or negligent failure to comply with an Article 5, 6, or 7 obligation, an Article 8(2) measure, an Article 18(1) remedy, an Article 24 interim measure, or an Article 25 binding commitment.
Article 30 raises the ceiling to 20% of total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where the gatekeeper committed the same or a similar Article 5, 6, or 7 infringement in relation to the same core platform service as one found in a adopted in the preceding 8 years.
A separate ceiling of 1% of total worldwide turnover can apply to undertakings, including gatekeepers where applicable, and associations of undertakings. Article 30(3) lists the covered intentional or negligent failures, including specified designation information and notification duties, Article 14 information, Article 15 descriptions, data or algorithm access, information requests, inspections, Commission monitoring measures, the Article 28 compliance function, and Article 34(4) file-access conditions. Check the list rather than treating every procedural defect as a 1% offence.
The ceiling does not determine the fine. Article 30 requires the Commission to consider gravity, duration, and recurrence, plus delay caused to proceedings for procedural fines. A percentage should therefore be applied only to the legally relevant turnover base for a ceiling scenario; it is not an estimate of the likely fine. On 23 April 2025, the Commission imposed decision-specific fines of EUR 500 million on Apple and EUR 200 million on Meta. On 23 July 2026, it announced two Google fines of EUR 460 million and EUR 430 million.
Article 31 are daily compulsion tools, not Article 30 fines. The ceiling is 5% of average daily worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year per day, calculated from the date set in the Commission decision.
The DMA lists the obligations that can be compelled this way: compliance with Article 8(2) measures, Article 18(1) decisions, information requests, data and algorithm access requests, inspections, interim measures, binding commitments, and Article 29 non-compliance decisions.
If the undertaking or association later satisfies the obligation, the Commission may set the definitive amount at a figure lower than the amount that would have arisen under the original periodic-payment decision.
Article 29 is the central enforcement trigger for many DMA penalties. A can cover failure to comply with Articles 5, 6, or 7, Article 8(2) specified measures, Article 18(1) remedies, Article 24 interim measures, or Article 25 commitments.
Before adopting a , the Commission must communicate preliminary findings to the gatekeeper and explain the measures it is considering or considers the gatekeeper should take. A final non-compliance decision must order the gatekeeper to cease and desist within an appropriate deadline and explain how it plans to comply.
For Article 18, a gatekeeper is deemed to have engaged in when the Commission issued at least three Article 29 decisions against it, concerning any core platform services, within the 8 years before the decision opening the market investigation. A remedy also requires the investigation to show systematic infringement of Articles 5, 6, or 7 and that the gatekeeper maintained, strengthened, or extended its gatekeeper position. The Commission may then impose only behavioural or structural remedies that are proportionate and necessary.
The Article 11 compliance report template shows the evidence style the Commission expects: separate standalone annexes for each designated core platform service and each applicable Article 5 to 7 obligation, with compliance statements, supporting data, internal documents, implementation dates, product and geographic scope, technical or engineering changes, user-interface changes, terms and remuneration changes, consultation records, alternatives considered, testing, indicators, and monitoring tools.
That evidence can be relevant to whether the Commission finds intentional or negligent failure, whether the narrow repeat test is met, and whether an implementation claim can be verified. The template also states that failure to provide true, correct, and complete information may influence the Commission's prioritisation when considering Article 29 proceedings. It does not say that an incomplete template response automatically proves an Article 30 infringement.
Build a traceable penalties package showing the obligation, affected core platform service, change made, evidence of effectiveness, remediation owner, business-user or end-user feedback, and raw data that can be produced if requested.
The DMA gives affected gatekeepers, undertakings, and associations of undertakings a right to be heard before specified Commission decisions, including Article 29 and Article 30 decisions and Article 31(2) decisions setting a definitive periodic penalty amount. Observations on preliminary findings must be allowed within a Commission-set time limit of at least 14 days.
Articles 32 and 33 set 5-year limitation periods for imposing and enforcing fines or , with interruption and suspension rules. The limitation clock for continuing or repeated infringements starts when the infringement ceases, and Commission actions such as information requests, inspection authorisations, and opening proceedings can interrupt the period for imposing penalties.
Article 44 requires publication of decisions under Articles 29, 30, and 31, including the parties, main content, and any penalties imposed, while protecting legitimate confidentiality interests. Article 45 gives the Court of Justice unlimited jurisdiction to review Commission decisions imposing fines or and to cancel, reduce, or increase the amount.
Article 30 caps the ordinary gatekeeper fine at 10% of total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year for specified intentional or negligent non-compliance. The cap can rise to 20% for the same or a similar Article 5, 6, or 7 infringement involving the same core platform service after a in the preceding 8 years.
No. Article 31 are daily compulsion payments, capped at 5% of average daily worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year per day from the date set in the Commission decision.
Keep the Commission request or decision, the affected core platform service and obligation, implementation dates, product and geographic scope, technical changes, user-interface changes, supporting data, raw-data availability, testing and indicators, management-body review, compliance-function reports, user feedback, and remediation status.
Classify the alleged failure, identify the applicable ceiling and turnover basis, and preserve the decision-specific evidence before estimating exposure.
Ask cited questions about DMA fine caps, periodic penalty payments, non-compliance decisions, remedies, and evidence records.
Walk through Article 30 and Article 31 exposure, evidence gaps, and remediation ownership with Sorena.
"right to be heard"
"separate and standalone annexes for each core platform service"
"The DMA contains the main rules"
"Templates"
"the opportunity of being heard"