DMA penalties and fines

For a gatekeeper non-compliance decision, Article 30 allows the Commission to impose fines up to 10% of the gatekeeper's total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year. That cap applies where the Commission finds intentional or negligent failure to comply with Article 5, 6, or 7 obligations, measures specified in an Article 8(2) decision, Article 18(1) remedies, Article 24 interim measures, or Article 25 binding commitments.

The repeat-infringement cap is higher. Article 30 allows fines up to 20% of total worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year where the gatekeeper committed the same or a similar Article 5, 6, or 7 infringement in relation to the same core platform service as one found in a non-compliance decision adopted in the preceding 8 years.

A separate 1% worldwide-turnover cap can apply to undertakings, including gatekeepers where applicable, and associations of undertakings for procedural failures such as missing or misleading designation information, concentration notifications, consumer-profiling descriptions, requested data or algorithm access, inspection cooperation, monitoring obligations, compliance-function duties, or access-to-file conditions.

Article 31 periodic penalty payments are not the same as Article 30 fines. They are daily payments used to compel compliance, capped at 5% of average daily worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year per day, calculated from the date set by the Commission's decision.

The DMA lists the obligations that can be compelled this way: compliance with Article 8(2) measures, Article 18(1) decisions, information requests, data and algorithm access requests, inspections, interim measures, binding commitments, and Article 29 non-compliance decisions.

If the undertaking or association later satisfies the obligation, the Commission may set the definitive amount at a figure lower than the amount that would have arisen under the original periodic-payment decision.

Article 29 is the central enforcement trigger for many DMA penalties. A non-compliance decision can cover failure to comply with Articles 5, 6, or 7, Article 8(2) specified measures, Article 18(1) remedies, Article 24 interim measures, or Article 25 commitments.

Before adopting a non-compliance decision, the Commission must communicate preliminary findings to the gatekeeper and explain the measures it is considering or considers the gatekeeper should take. A final non-compliance decision must order the gatekeeper to cease and desist within an appropriate deadline and explain how it plans to comply.

For systematic non-compliance, Article 18 allows the Commission, after a market investigation, to impose proportionate and necessary behavioural or structural remedies. The DMA definition is narrow: systematic non-compliance requires at least three Article 29 non-compliance decisions within 8 years for any core platform services and obligations in Articles 5, 6, or 7.

The Article 11 compliance report template shows the evidence style the Commission expects: separate standalone annexes for each designated core platform service and each applicable Article 5 to 7 obligation, with compliance statements, supporting data, internal documents, implementation dates, product and geographic scope, technical or engineering changes, user-interface changes, terms and remuneration changes, consultation records, alternatives considered, testing, indicators, and monitoring tools.

That evidence is directly relevant to penalty work because Article 30 exposure often turns on whether a gatekeeper intentionally or negligently failed to comply, whether the failure was repeated, and whether the Commission can verify the implementation record. The template also states that failure to provide true, correct, and complete information may influence the Commission's prioritisation in opening Article 29 proceedings.

For a penalties file, the useful record is not a broad compliance narrative. It is a traceable package showing the obligation, the affected core platform service, the change made, the evidence proving effectiveness, the owner who can remediate, the user or business-user feedback received, and the raw data that can be produced if requested.

The DMA gives affected gatekeepers, undertakings, and associations of undertakings a right to be heard before specified Commission decisions, including Article 29 and Article 30 decisions and Article 31(2) decisions setting a definitive periodic penalty amount. Observations on preliminary findings must be allowed within a Commission-set time limit of at least 14 days.

Articles 32 and 33 set 5-year limitation periods for imposing and enforcing fines or periodic penalty payments, with interruption and suspension rules. The limitation clock for continuing or repeated infringements starts when the infringement ceases, and Commission actions such as information requests, inspection authorisations, and opening proceedings can interrupt the period for imposing penalties.

Article 44 requires publication of decisions under Articles 29, 30, and 31, including the parties, main content, and any penalties imposed, while protecting legitimate confidentiality interests. Article 45 gives the Court of Justice unlimited jurisdiction to review Commission decisions imposing fines or periodic penalty payments and to cancel, reduce, or increase the amount.