Classify an AI system or GPAI model before launch, procurement, integration, substantial modification, or EU use by collecting the facts needed for Article 2 scope, Article 3 definitions, Article 5 prohibitions, Article 6 high-risk routes, Annex III use cases, and GPAI status.
Use the intake record to separate provider, deployer, importer, distributor, authorised representative, product manufacturer, downstream provider, and GPAI model-provider responsibilities before assigning compliance work.
Use this intake workflow to decide first whether the item is an or a general-purpose AI model, then whether the EU AI Act applies, prohibits the practice, classifies the system as high-risk under Article 6, adds Article 50 transparency duties, or classifies the model as a GPAI model with systemic risk. Product, legal, compliance, procurement, security, privacy, and model-governance teams use the output as a structured evidence record grounded in the system's facts.
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Section 1
Intake record header
Start with a stable record that describes the system or model, the EU connection, the operator roles, and the exact classification question. Do not classify from a product nickname alone; Article 3 classification depends on intended purpose, how the system is placed on the market or put into service, who uses it, and whether a GPAI model is integrated or supplied separately.
Create one intake record per materially different intended purpose. A recruiting screen, a customer-support assistant, a credit-scoring component, and a GPAI model API can have different AI Act routes even when they share an underlying model.
Record ID, system or model name, version, release stage, business owner, legal owner, technical owner, and evidence owner.
Short description of the machine-based system, input types, output types, autonomy level, adaptiveness after deployment, and whether outputs are predictions, content, recommendations, or decisions.
Intended purpose, context and conditions of use, user-facing materials, instructions for use, affected persons or groups, and reasonably foreseeable misuse.
EU nexus: provider or deployer location, Union market placement, Union put-into-service facts, Union output use, importer or distributor involvement, and whether affected persons are located in the Union.
Model facts: whether the item is an , a GPAI model, a general-purpose AI system based on a GPAI model, or a downstream AI system integrating another model.
The first classification gate is not risk tier; it is whether the AI Act applies to the fact pattern. Article 2 covers providers placing AI systems or GPAI models on the Union market or putting AI systems into service in the Union, deployers established or located in the Union, third-country providers and deployers where output is used in the Union, importers, distributors, product manufacturers, authorised representatives, and affected persons located in the Union.
The same screen must capture exclusions so that out-of-scope decisions are not overbroad. Article 2 exclusions include areas outside Union law, military, defence or national security purposes, certain international law-enforcement or judicial cooperation uses, AI systems or models specifically developed and put into service solely for scientific research and development, pre-market research, testing or development activity other than real-world testing, purely personal non-professional deployer use, and free/open-source AI systems unless they are placed on the market or put into service as high-risk systems or fall under Article 5 or Article 50.
Exclusion evidence: purpose category, research or pre-market status, real-world testing status, open-source licence terms, whether the system is high-risk, prohibited, or under Article 50, and whether the deployer use is purely personal and non-professional.
Decision output: in scope, out of scope, partial scope, or escalate because EU nexus, role, output-use, research, open-source, or national-security facts are incomplete.
Run the Article 5 screen before high-risk classification. A prohibited-practice hit should stop normal intake and move to legal escalation, product withdrawal, redesign, or non-use review rather than being treated as a manageable high-risk obligation.
Capture the exact practice, deployment context, affected persons, purpose, expected effect, data used, safeguards claimed, and whether any narrow law-enforcement biometric exception is being asserted.
Manipulation or deception: subliminal, purposefully manipulative, or deceptive techniques that materially distort behaviour and cause or are reasonably likely to cause significant harm.
Vulnerability exploitation: age, disability, or social or economic situation used to materially distort behaviour in a way causing or likely causing significant harm.
Social scoring: evaluation or classification of people over time leading to unrelated, unjustified, or disproportionate detrimental treatment.
Criminal-offence risk prediction: risk assessment of natural persons based solely on profiling or personality traits, unless supporting human assessment based on objective and verifiable facts linked to criminal activity.
Biometric and emotion restrictions: untargeted facial-image scraping, workplace or education emotion inference except for medical or safety reasons, and biometric categorisation to infer protected characteristics.
Real-time remote biometric identification in publicly accessible spaces for law enforcement: record whether a listed objective, strict necessity, fundamental rights impact assessment, registration, prior authorisation, notification, and national-law conditions are present.
Content prohibitions from 2 December 2026: record whether the provider intends the system to generate or manipulate the specified non-consensual intimate material or child sexual abuse material, whether that output is reasonably foreseeable and reproducible without adequate safeguards, or whether a deployer uses the system for that prohibited purpose.
If no Article 5 prohibition is identified, classify high-risk status through both Article 6 routes. Article 6(1) covers AI used as a safety component of a product, or as a product itself, where the product is covered by Annex I Union harmonisation legislation and requires third-party conformity assessment. Amended Article 6 excludes systems used solely for non-safety user assistance, performance optimisation, service efficiency, automation, convenience, or quality control from the safety-component route, while confirming that a system whose failure or malfunction would endanger health and safety is a safety component. A product does not meet Article 6(1)(b) where third-party assessment is required only for risks unrelated to health and safety. Article 6(2) covers AI systems listed in Annex III.
For Annex III, intake must capture the use-case area and the Article 6(3) derogation analysis. A system listed in Annex III can be documented as not high-risk only where it does not pose a significant risk of harm to health, safety, or fundamental rights, including by not materially influencing decision-making, and one of the Article 6(3) conditions applies. Profiling of natural persons remains high-risk.
Article 6(1) evidence: product category, Annex I legislation, whether the AI is a safety component or product, third-party conformity assessment requirement, product manufacturer, and conformity owner.
Annex III evidence: biometrics, critical infrastructure, education or vocational training, employment or worker management, essential public or private services, law enforcement, migration/asylum/border control, or administration of justice and democratic processes.
Article 6(3) derogation evidence: narrow procedural task, improvement of a completed human activity, pattern or deviation detection without replacing or influencing human assessment without proper review, or preparatory task to an Annex III assessment.
Mandatory override: if the system performs profiling of natural persons in an Annex III use case, classify it as high-risk rather than relying on an Article 6(3) derogation.
Registration evidence: if an Annex III provider concludes not-high-risk under Article 6(3), record the assessment and Article 49(2) EU database registration need.
Run Article 50 even when the system is neither prohibited nor high-risk. The duties attach to particular functions: direct interaction with people, generation of synthetic audio, image, video, or text, emotion recognition or biometric categorisation, and deployment of deepfakes or certain AI-generated text published to inform the public on matters of public interest.
Assign the duty to the correct actor. Providers must design covered interactive or generative systems so the required disclosure or machine-readable marking can be delivered. Deployers carry the disclosure duties for emotion recognition, biometric categorisation, deepfakes, and covered public-interest text. The disclosure must be clear and distinguishable no later than the first interaction or exposure, subject to the article's law-enforcement, artistic, satirical, and editorial exceptions.
Interactive system: record whether a person is informed that they are interacting with AI unless that fact is obvious to a reasonably well-informed, observant, and circumspect person in the circumstances.
Synthetic content: record whether outputs are marked in a machine-readable format and detectable as artificially generated or manipulated; document why any technical infeasibility or disproportionate-cost qualification is relied on.
Emotion recognition or biometric categorisation: record the deployer's notice to exposed people and the separate data-protection basis and information duties.
Deepfake or public-interest text: record the deployer's disclosure, publication context, editorial control, and any artistic, satirical, creative, fictional, or law-enforcement qualification.
Application date: Article 50 applies from 2 August 2026. Use the Commission's July 2026 final transparency guidelines as non-binding interpretation and keep the Regulation as the controlling legal text.
Run a separate GPAI screen whenever the intake involves a model supplied for integration, an API model, a foundation model, a modified model, or an based on a GPAI model. Article 3 distinguishes a general-purpose AI model from a general-purpose AI system and defines downstream providers that integrate AI models into AI systems.
The GPAI screen should not replace system classification. A downstream built on a GPAI model can still need Article 5, Article 6, Annex III, Article 50, deployer, and registration analysis.
GPAI status evidence: training scale, significant generality, capability to perform a wide range of distinct tasks, integration into downstream systems or applications, and whether the model is still only used for research, development, or prototyping before market placement.
Provider evidence: who develops the model, who has it developed, who places it on the Union market, who provides it under its own name or trademark, and whether a third-country provider needs an EU authorised representative.
Systemic-risk evidence: training compute, parameters, dataset size or tokens, modalities, benchmarks, autonomy, scalability, tools access, Union business-user reach, registered end-users, Commission designation, notification, or reassessment request.
Article 53 evidence: technical documentation, downstream-provider documentation, copyright policy, and public summary of training content.
Article 55 evidence: for systemic-risk models, model evaluation, adversarial testing, systemic-risk assessment and mitigation, serious-incident tracking and reporting, and cybersecurity protection.
Close the intake by assigning role-specific owners and reopening conditions. Article 25 can shift provider responsibilities to a distributor, importer, deployer, or other third party that puts its name or trademark on a high-risk , substantially modifies a high-risk system, or changes the intended purpose of an AI system so that it becomes high-risk.
Treat classification as a maintained record. Reassess when the intended purpose, EU market path, user population, model supplier, product integration, Annex III use case, profiling status, biometric function, GPAI capabilities, training compute, documentation, or post-market evidence changes.
Record legal status with every application date. The original Article 5 prohibitions have applied since 2 February 2025, the content-related Article 5 additions apply from 2 December 2026, GPAI provider obligations have applied since 2 August 2025, and Article 50 applies from 2 August 2026. Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 entered into force on 27 July 2026 and applies Chapter III Sections 1-3 from 2 December 2027 for Article 6(2) Annex III systems and from 2 August 2028 for Article 6(1) Annex I systems.
Provider boundary: identify who owns technical documentation, conformity assessment, high-risk registration, GPAI documentation, and public training-content summary duties.
Deployer boundary: identify who controls use context, worker or affected-person notices, input data, logs under deployer control, monitoring, fundamental-rights impact assessment where applicable, and authority notifications.
Supply-chain boundary: identify importer, distributor, authorised representative, product manufacturer, third-party tool or model supplier, written agreements, technical access, and assistance dependencies.
Reassessment triggers: substantial modification, intended-purpose change, new EU market or output-use path, new Annex III use case, profiling added, prohibited-practice risk, GPAI systemic-risk threshold or designation, serious incident, authority request, or registration-content change.
Final output fields: classification result, article route, role allocation, evidence gaps, escalation owner, source citations, approval date, next review trigger, and the reason the page owner can defend the classification.
Classify EU AI Act scope, risk tier, GPAI status, and role ownership
Sorena can help convert this intake into a maintained classification record with source citations, evidence gaps, role boundaries, and reassessment triggers for product, model, procurement, and compliance teams.
Final Commission guidelines published on 20 July 2026 explain the Article 50 duties that apply from 2 August 2026; the guidance is interpretive rather than binding legislation.