Use this page to screen an AI system against the eight Article 5 prohibited-practice categories before launch, procurement, integration, or material product change.
The focus is practical evidence: what the system does, who it affects, which Article 5 limb is relevant, and whether any narrow exception or condition is actually documented.
Structured answer sets in this page tree.
Cited legal and guidance references.
Article 5 of the EU AI Act prohibits specified AI practices rather than merely classifying them as high risk. A useful screening record should identify the AI system or planned use, test it against each Article 5 category, document any exception relied on, and preserve the product, data, legal, and approval evidence behind the conclusion.
The Article 5 review should start with the eight prohibited-practice categories. Do not collapse them into a generic high-risk assessment: several categories turn on specific facts such as deception, vulnerability, biometric data, criminal-risk prediction, or law-enforcement use in a publicly accessible space.
For each category, record whether the system is placed on the EU market, put into service, or used in the Union, what function is enabled, what data is used, and which people or groups can be affected.
Some Article 5 entries include carve-outs or conditions. Treat those as evidence requirements, not as informal risk arguments. The screening record should quote the relevant Article 5 limb, identify the specific exception being relied on, and show why the facts fit that exception.
The strictest evidence burden is for real-time remote biometric identification in publicly accessible spaces for law enforcement. Article 5 allows it only when strictly necessary for specified objectives and subject to safeguards, national-law conditions, fundamental-rights impact assessment, EU database registration, authorisation, notification, and reporting steps described in the Article.
The most useful Article 5 record is short but factual. It should let a reviewer reconstruct the system purpose, user journey, data sources, affected persons, and exception analysis without interviewing the product team again.
Keep separate evidence for negative conclusions. A statement that Article 5 does not apply is weak unless it explains, for example, why a scoring feature is not social scoring, why biometric processing is not covered by the prohibited biometric categories, or why behavioural nudging does not meet the manipulation or vulnerability tests.
Use these questions before approving a feature, buying a vendor system, changing a data source, or enabling a biometric or profiling capability. A yes, unclear, or vendor-only answer should stop approval until the Article 5 record is completed.
The review should be repeated when the same AI model is embedded in a new workflow. Article 5 can turn on deployment context, especially workplace, education, law enforcement, public accessibility, vulnerable groups, and the consequences of a score or prediction.
A prohibited-practices check is an approval gate. The output should be a dated screening record with category-by-category conclusions, not a general AI-risk memo.
If a category is potentially triggered, pause release or procurement until the legal, product, data, and operational owners have either removed the relevant function, narrowed the use case, or documented why the Article 5 exception and conditions are satisfied.
No. Article 5 prohibits specific biometric uses, including certain biometric categorisation to deduce protected characteristics and real-time remote biometric identification in publicly accessible spaces for law enforcement unless strict Article 5 conditions are met. Other biometric systems may still need separate AI Act analysis, but they are not automatically Article 5 prohibited practices.
It should prove which AI system and use case were reviewed, how each of the eight Article 5 categories was assessed, what data and user-impact evidence supported the conclusion, and whether any stated exception or condition was relied on.
Sorena can help turn this Article 5 screening guide into a structured review record with category conclusions, source citations, owners, and release-blocking evidence gaps.
Ask source-linked questions about Article 5 categories, exceptions, and evidence needed for a prohibited-practices review.
Review an AI system, supplier claim, or biometric use case against the EU AI Act Article 5 screening categories.
"No decision that produces an adverse legal effect"
"All AI systems considered a clear threat"
"laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence"