Check what the system does, who it affects and whether every element of a prohibition is present. If you rely on an exception, record its conditions and supporting evidence before approval.
1
Section 1
1. Check each prohibited practice
The original eight categories have applied since 2 February 2025. The amendment that entered into force on 27 July 2026 adds content-related prohibitions from 2 December 2026.
For each category below, record the enabled function, data, affected people and EU market or use connection. Check the detailed legal test before concluding that a category applies.
Manipulation or deception: subliminal techniques beyond consciousness, or purposefully manipulative or deceptive techniques, that appreciably impair informed decisions and materially distort behaviour. They must lead to a decision the person would not otherwise take, causing or reasonably likely to cause significant harm.
Exploitation: exploiting age, disability or a specific social or economic situation to materially distort behaviour, causing or reasonably likely to cause significant harm.
Social scoring: evaluating people or groups over time using social behaviour or personal characteristics, where the score leads to detrimental treatment in an unrelated context or treatment that is unjustified or disproportionate.
Criminal-risk prediction: predicting an individual's likelihood of committing a crime solely from profiling or personality traits and characteristics.
Face scraping: creating or expanding facial-recognition databases through untargeted scraping of internet or CCTV images.
Workplace or education emotion inference: prohibited except for medical or safety reasons.
Sensitive biometric categorisation: using biometric data to infer the protected characteristics specified in .
Live remote biometric identification for law enforcement in publicly accessible spaces: prohibited except for the specified objectives and strict safeguards.
Content prohibitions from 2 December 2026: placing on the market or putting into service systems intended to generate or manipulate specified non-consensual intimate material or child sexual abuse material; or foreseeable, reproducible generation without adequate safeguards. Deployer use for the prohibited purpose has a separate test.
Supports the new prohibited-content category, separate provider and deployer tests, safeguards standard, scope limits, 27 July 2026 entry into force, and 2 December 2026 application date.
2
Section 2
2. Prove any exception or limiting condition
For each claimed exception, cite the precise provision and attach the facts that satisfy it. A general risk assessment or acceptable-use policy cannot establish an exception by itself.
Live remote biometric identification for law enforcement requires strict necessity, a permitted objective, national-law permission, a fundamental-rights impact assessment, EU registration, authorisation, notification and applicable reporting. These conditions apply to use in publicly accessible spaces. Limit the use to the necessary people, place and time.
Permitted objectives include targeted searches for specified victims or missing people; preventing specified substantial threats to life, physical safety or terrorism; and locating or identifying suspects for the (1)(h)(iii) purposes and Annex II offences. The offence must carry a national maximum custodial sentence or detention order of at least four years.
In a duly justified urgent case, request authorisation without undue delay and within 24 hours. Refusal requires immediate cessation and deletion of data, results and outputs. An adverse legal decision cannot rest solely on the identification output.
The new content rules distinguish provider capability and safeguards from deployer purpose. For providers, assess intended output, foreseeable misuse and circumvention, reproducibility, and whether reasonable state-of-the-art safeguards demonstrably prevent or sufficiently reduce the output. Accidental output during lawful use does not meet the same test as deliberate prohibited deployer use.
Non-consensual intimate material concerns realistic intimate or sexually explicit depictions of an identifiable person without freely given, specific, informed, unambiguous and explicit consent to generation or manipulation. Recital 12 describes exceptional medical diagnosis or treatment by professionals when a person cannot consent, such as an emergency, subject to rights, data-protection and medical law.
(1a) limits the foreseeable-output test to outcomes reproducible without significant technical modification, combined with inadequate safeguards to prevent the outcome and correct misuse. Article 5(1b) excludes manipulation that neither increases exposure of intimate parts nor changes the nature of depicted sexual activity. The child sexual abuse material provision retains the national-law "without right" defence.
Criminal-risk support: retain the existing human assessment based on objective, verifiable facts directly linked to criminal activity, and show the system's limited supporting role.
Emotion inference: retain the medical or safety purpose, operating limits and approval.
Biometric datasets: for lawful labelling or filtering, retain the lawful acquisition basis, purpose and reason it falls outside prohibited individual categorisation.
Live identification: retain the objective, target, necessity, proportionality, scope, authorisation or urgency record, notifications and any required deletion.
Content safeguards: retain data cleaning, refusal training, prompt/output controls, filters, use restrictions, abuse detection, notice-and-action, consent records, circumvention tests and corrective action.
Supports the Article 5 exceptions and conditions for criminal-risk support tools, medical or safety emotion inference, biometric dataset handling, and law-enforcement biometric identification.
unless and in so far as such use is strictly necessary
Supports the separate provider and deployer tests, safeguard examples, consent and medical conditions, and exclusions from the new prohibited-content category.
3
Section 3
3. Keep a short, factual screening record
A reviewer should be able to follow the system purpose, user journey, data sources, affected people and conclusion from the record.
Explain why a prohibition does not apply as well as why it does. For example, state why scoring is outside the social-scoring test or why behavioural influence does not meet the harmful-manipulation test.
System: intended purpose, supplier, provider/deployer role, EU connection, users, affected groups and approval request.
Category decisions: one row per prohibition with facts, conclusion, reviewer, citation and open questions.
Data: facial images, biometric or behavioural data, profiling inputs, vulnerability indicators and workplace, education or law-enforcement context.
Effects: evidence about significant harm, detrimental treatment, unrelated context, proportionality and impaired informed choice.
Exceptions: relevant medical/safety evidence, human-assessment facts, lawful dataset basis, targeted search, authorisation, notification and urgency records.
Review triggers: material changes to data, people, interface, scoring, law-enforcement use, biometrics or supplier terms.
Explains the AI Act risk-based framework and identifies the original eight prohibited practices as the unacceptable-risk category before Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 added another category.
The AI Act prohibits eight practices
4
Section 4
4. Ask these questions before approval
Use these questions for new features, purchases, data sources and biometric or profiling functions. Pause approval when a possible match remains unresolved or rests only on an unverified supplier claim.
Repeat the check when the same model enters a different workflow. Workplace, education, public-space, law-enforcement and vulnerability facts can change the result.
Does the system use subliminal, manipulative or deceptive techniques that impair informed choice and could cause significant harm?
Does it exploit age, disability or social or economic vulnerability to materially distort behaviour with significant actual or likely harm?
Does it score people over time and cause unrelated, unjustified or disproportionate detrimental treatment?
Does criminal-risk prediction rely solely on profiling or personality, rather than supporting a human assessment grounded in directly linked, verifiable facts?
Does it build a facial-recognition database from untargeted internet or CCTV scraping?
Does it infer emotions at work or in education, and is any claimed medical or safety exception evidenced?
Does biometric categorisation infer race, political views, union membership, religious or philosophical beliefs, sex life or sexual orientation?
Does law enforcement use live remote identification in a publicly accessible space, and are all exception conditions satisfied?
From 2 December 2026, do provider intent, foreseeable reproducible outputs without adequate safeguards, or deliberate deployer use meet either new content prohibition?
Supports the screening questions by providing the specific Article 5 prohibited-practice wording.
publicly accessible spaces for the purposes of law enforcement
5
Section 5
5. Resolve open issues before release
Save a dated decision for every category. If a possible prohibition remains, pause approval until the responsible legal, product, data and operating owners resolve it.
The resolution may require removing a function, restricting its use or proving that an exception applies and will be maintained in operation.
Does ban all biometric AI?
No. It bans specific uses, including specified sensitive categorisation and live remote law-enforcement identification in publicly accessible spaces unless strict conditions are met. Other biometric uses still need high-risk, transparency and data-protection checks.
What should our screening record show?
Identify the system and use, the decision for each prohibition, the data and impact evidence, the applicable date and the proof for any exception.
Name the system, supplier, workflow, affected people, EU connection and approval request.
Record yes, no, not yet applicable or unresolved for each original category and the new content prohibitions.
Attach screenshots, user journeys, model or supplier documentation, data evidence and tests.
For an exception, attach the exact condition, factual proof, approver and control keeping the use within it.
Block release for unresolved issues. Review after changes to purpose, data, users, geography, biometrics, scoring or law-enforcement use.
Official AI Act Service Desk text for Article 5 categories, exceptions, conditions, authorisation, notification, and reporting provisions.
Provides the Article 5 text and summary used to list the prohibited-practice categories and their stated exceptions.
Supports the Article 5 exceptions and conditions for criminal-risk support tools, medical or safety emotion inference, biometric dataset handling, and law-enforcement biometric identification.
Show 3 more
Supports the evidence fields by naming the Article 5 facts that determine whether a prohibited practice or exception is present.
Supports the screening questions by providing the specific Article 5 prohibited-practice wording.
Supports the checklist structure by providing the Article 5 categories, conditions, authorisation requirements, and reporting elements.
"The following AI practices shall be prohibited"
More quoted passages
"unless and in so far as such use is strictly necessary"
"objective evidence or clear indications"
"publicly accessible spaces for the purposes of law enforcement"
"No decision that produces an adverse legal effect"
Commission public explainer used for the unacceptable-risk framing and the original list of eight prohibited practices before Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 added another category.
Explains the AI Act risk-based framework and identifies the original eight prohibited practices as the unacceptable-risk category before Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 added another category.
Confirms that prohibited practices sit in the unacceptable-risk tier of the Commission's AI Act explanation.
Binding amendment used for the ninth prohibited-content category, provider and deployer tests, scope limits, safeguards, and its 2 December 2026 application date.
Supports the new prohibited-content category, separate provider and deployer tests, safeguards standard, scope limits, 27 July 2026 entry into force, and 2 December 2026 application date.
Supports the separate provider and deployer tests, safeguard examples, consent and medical conditions, and exclusions from the new prohibited-content category.