- Explains the network, personal-data and privacy, and fraud risks behind the activated RED essential requirements.
"Protection of the network or its functioning from harm"
Build a release-ready evidence trail for radio equipment affected by Article 3(3)(d), (e), and (f) of Directive 2014/53/EU as activated by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/30.
Use this workflow to classify the product, decide which cyber requirements apply, capture safeguards and test evidence, and document the conformity-assessment route before CE release.
Structured answer sets in this page tree.
Cited legal and guidance references.
RED cyber compliance starts with a product-specific classification, not a generic security checklist. For each radio product, record whether Article 3(3)(d), (e), or (f) applies, why any derogation applies, which standards or notified-body route supports the claim, and where the evidence lives in the technical documentation.
Start with the actual product architecture and user journey. Article 3(3)(d) is triggered by internet-connected radio equipment. Article 3(3)(e) depends on the listed equipment categories and whether the equipment can process personal data, traffic data, or location data. Article 3(3)(f) applies to internet-connected radio equipment that enables the holder or user to transfer money, monetary value, or virtual currency.
The classification memo should be short enough to review at release, but detailed enough to show how firmware, companion apps, cloud services, sensors, payment functions, and user roles were considered.
Before assigning controls, confirm whether another EU regime removes the product from one or more RED cyber requirements. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/30 excludes radio equipment covered by medical-device and in vitro diagnostic medical-device rules from Article 3(3)(d), (e), and (f). It also excludes equipment covered by the cited aviation, motor-vehicle, and electronic-road-toll legislation from Article 3(3)(e) and (f).
The application date was changed by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/2444. Treat 1 August 2025 as the operative date for the delegated RED cyber requirements unless a product team is documenting voluntary early compliance.
The evidence matrix should connect each applicable RED cyber requirement to concrete product evidence. A reviewer should be able to trace from the legal trigger to the product feature, safeguard, verification result, residual issue, release owner, and technical-documentation location.
Do not use a single cybersecurity policy as the only evidence. RED evidence should include product-specific architecture, firmware and software behavior, data flows, authentication and access controls, update behavior, abuse cases, test results, supplier inputs, and conformity-assessment decisions.
Use Sorena to convert product facts, supplier inputs, standards decisions, and Article 3(3)(d/e/f) evidence into a reviewable RED cybersecurity pack.
After classification and evidence mapping, decide how the manufacturer will demonstrate conformity. Harmonised standards can support presumption of conformity when they are available and cited for the relevant requirement, but standards are not mandatory. Where the standards route does not support the claim, document the alternative conformity-assessment route and whether a notified body is needed.
Keep cyber evidence aligned with the broader RED technical documentation, EU declaration of conformity, CE marking decision, instructions, and post-release change controls. A firmware or cloud-service change can undermine the original evidence if the release process does not re-run the affected Article 3(3)(d/e/f) checks.
"Protection of the network or its functioning from harm"
"It shall apply from 1 August 2025."
"The manufacturer is responsible for the conformity assessment."
"radio equipment does not harm the network or its functioning"
"relevant notified bodies"
"Harmonised standards are European standards"