FAQGLOBALFIPS 140-3

FIPS 140-3 Entropy evidence

A direct answer on what entropy evidence should show before a team relies on a FIPS 140-3 module, DRBG, or SSP-generation claim.

Grounded in FIPS 140-3 and CMVP Implementation Guidance; it does not assert that any specific source, DRBG, module, or certificate is approved.

Author
Sorena AI
Published
May 9, 2026
Updated
May 9, 2026
Questions
3

Structured answer sets in this page tree.

Primary sources
4

Cited legal and guidance references.

Publication metadata
Sorena AI
Published May 9, 2026
Updated May 9, 2026
Overview

Under FIPS 140-3, entropy evidence should show how the module obtains entropy, where the source sits relative to the cryptographic boundary or tested operational environment physical perimeter, what minimum entropy amount is claimed for SSP generation, and how that claim is reflected in the Security Policy, test report, and any certificate caveat.

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3 of 3 questions
Question 1

What should entropy evidence answer first?

Start with the entropy path, not the product claim. The evidence should identify whether the module generates entropy itself, calls a well-defined source through a GetEntropy() interface, passively receives externally supplied entropy, or combines active and passive inputs. CMVP Implementation Guidance 9.3.A treats those cases differently because the laboratory may be able to corroborate some entropy-strength estimates directly while other deployments require warning caveats.

The core record should therefore include the module boundary, TOEPP or physical perimeter, source location, interface type, DRBG seeding path, and the minimum bits of entropy generated, requested, accepted, or believed to have been loaded for SSP generation. A statement that the product uses a DRBG is not enough; the question is whether the seeding evidence supports the strength claim being made for generated SSPs.

  • Map every entropy source to the cryptographic boundary, TOEPP, physical perimeter, and DRBG instantiation or reseed event it supports.
  • Distinguish direct GetEntropy() access from seed loaders, LOAD commands, preloaded seeds, caller-supplied API buffers, files, and other passive inputs.
  • Record the minimum entropy amount used for SSP generation and the evidence basis for that amount.
  • Check whether the design triggers a certificate caveat such as modified SSP strength or no assurance of minimum generated-SSP strength.
Citations
Question 2

What SP 800-90B evidence belongs in the file?

When an entropy evaluation is required, CMVP guidance points teams to SP 800-90B and IG D.K. The evidence package should include raw noise-source access details, statistical-test results, the entropy assessment tool version, and the laboratory's heuristic analysis of how the noise source works and why the claimed entropy rate is supported.

The Security Policy should document the overall generated entropy and the estimated entropy per source output bit when SP 800-90B testing applies. If the vendor claims IID behavior, the support needs to be rigorous and should address independence and identical distribution separately; the guidance warns that most noise sources do not produce IID events.

  • Keep the entropy-source description, raw data collection method, and rationale that collection does not alter source behavior.
  • Attach statistical-test outputs and the version of the CMVP SP 800-90B entropy assessment tool used.
  • Include the heuristic entropy analysis, not only the statistical-test result.
  • Document known or suspected noise-source failure modes and the health tests intended to detect them.
Citations
Question 3

How should teams review Security Policy and certificate evidence?

Review the Security Policy and certificate together. CMVP guidance requires different public statements depending on whether the module uses an internal source, a known source inside the TOEPP, an external source, a passive load, or a hybrid design. If entropy is externally loaded or cannot be directly verified for all deployments, the certificate may need a no-assurance caveat rather than a broad strength claim.

For multiple entropy sources, do not add entropy by intuition. CMVP guidance allows concatenating outputs from multiple independent SP 800-90B-compliant sources for a DRBG seed, but the Security Policy should explain which sources are creditable, whether they are physical or non-physical, and which method is used for entropy calculation. If sources are mutually dependent, at most one of those dependent sources may be credited.

  • Compare the design description, Security Policy entropy statement, ESV or ENT notation, and certificate caveat for the same module version.
  • Confirm that caller guidance is present when an external party must provide entropy with a minimum claimed strength.
  • For multiple sources, document independence before summing credited entropy.
  • Do not treat a CAVP algorithm certificate, DRBG name, or generic FIPS reference as proof that the module's entropy evidence supports the deployed configuration.
Citations
NIST CAVP validation search

CAVP records can support approved algorithm implementation checks, but algorithm evidence does not by itself establish module boundary or entropy-source validity.

Primary sources

References and citations

csrc.nist.gov
Referenced sections
  • IG 9.3.A and D.O support the Security Policy, certificate caveat, ESV or ENT notation, and multiple-source entropy review points.
"The Security Policy shall further explain the nature of the module's entropy sources"
csrc.nist.gov
Referenced sections
  • CAVP records can support approved algorithm implementation checks, but algorithm evidence does not by itself establish module boundary or entropy-source validity.
github.com
Referenced sections
  • CMVP guidance cites this public tool for SP 800-90B statistical testing; the tool output does not supersede the lab's heuristic analysis.
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