What should entropy evidence answer first?
Start with the entropy path, not the product claim. The evidence should identify whether the module generates entropy itself, calls a well-defined source through a GetEntropy() interface, passively receives externally supplied entropy, or combines active and passive inputs. CMVP Implementation Guidance 9.3.A treats those cases differently because the laboratory may be able to corroborate some entropy-strength estimates directly while other deployments require warning caveats.
The core record should therefore include the module boundary, TOEPP or physical perimeter, source location, interface type, DRBG seeding path, and the minimum bits of entropy generated, requested, accepted, or believed to have been loaded for SSP generation. A statement that the product uses a DRBG is not enough; the question is whether the seeding evidence supports the strength claim being made for generated SSPs.
- Map every entropy source to the cryptographic boundary, TOEPP, physical perimeter, and DRBG instantiation or reseed event it supports.
- Distinguish direct GetEntropy() access from seed loaders, LOAD commands, preloaded seeds, caller-supplied API buffers, files, and other passive inputs.
- Record the minimum entropy amount used for SSP generation and the evidence basis for that amount.
- Check whether the design triggers a certificate caveat such as modified SSP strength or no assurance of minimum generated-SSP strength.
IG 9.3.A is the main grounding for entropy-source scenarios, GetEntropy access, Security Policy entropy statements, and certificate caveats.
FIPS 140-3 establishes the cryptographic-module context and includes sensitive security parameter management among the module security requirement areas.