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Artifact GuideGLOBALFIPS 140-3

FIPS 140-3 How should teams handle approved mode under FIPS 140-3

A direct answer on , approved security services, service indicators, and evidence under FIPS 140-3.

Based on NIST FIPS 140-3 and Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) Implementation Guidance. Use it to scope evidence, not to claim validation.

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Author
Sorena AI
Published
May 9, 2026
Updated
Oct 15, 2026
3 sections3 primary sources
Overview

Short answer: do not treat as a general compliance label. Under FIPS 140-3, the useful question is whether each claimed approved security service uses approved security functions in an approved manner, gives the operator an unambiguous indicator, and is described correctly in the module .

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3 of 3 questions
Question 1

Handle approved-mode claims at the service level

Start with the validated cryptographic module and the service the operator invokes. FIPS 140-3 specifies requirements for cryptographic modules, and IG 2.4.C distinguishes an approved security service from other services that may run while the module is in an . Show-status, version, and other non-security services do not become approved security services merely because they are available in that mode.

For a customer, procurement, or audit answer, identify the specific module certificate and version, the service being called, the approved algorithm or process used by that service, and the operator-visible indicator that shows the service is approved. A broad statement that a product is "in FIPS mode" is not enough when the module can expose approved and non-approved services or use context-sensitive algorithms.

  • Map the claim to the validated cryptographic module boundary and the service table in the module .
  • Classify each callable service as an approved security service, a non-security service allowed in , a non-approved algorithm with no security claimed, or a service not available in approved mode.
  • Use the module's , return code, status output, log message, or other externally accessible signal only if it lets the operator unambiguously determine when an approved security service is in use.
Question 2

What evidence supports an approved-mode answer?

The evidence must let a reader trace the answer from a module certificate and to the exact service behavior. IG 2.4.C requires the Security Policy to list approved and non-approved services with their details and applicable indicators. The module must provide an externally accessible, operator-verifiable indicator; Security Policy text can explain that indicator but cannot replace it.

Evidence should also show the treatment of non-approved algorithms. IG 2.4.A permits limited uses in only when the algorithm does not meet a FIPS 140-3 requirement, does not compromise or improperly share an approved algorithm's critical security parameter (CSP), and cannot be confused with a security function. A non-approved security function that claims security is not made approved by a mode setting or disclaimer.

  • Module certificate number, module name, version, operational environment, and security level claims for the validated configuration.
  • service table showing approved and non-approved services, approved security service indicators, and any operator guidance needed to use a service in an approved manner.
  • Algorithm validation evidence for the approved security functions used by the claimed service, plus records showing required self-tests and approved parameters where applicable.
  • Configuration or runtime evidence showing that disallowed services are unavailable in and that non-approved algorithms with no security claimed are not presented as security functions.
Recommended next step

Prepare FIPS 140-3 approved-mode evidence

This answer helps connect approved-mode claims to module certificates, Security Policy service tables, service indicators, and algorithm validation evidence.

Assessment workflow
Map services to evidence

Convert approved-mode questions into service tables, indicator checks, and certificate evidence requests.

Explore next step
Research workflow
Ask a scoped follow-up

Use cited research support when module boundary, service indicator, or Security Policy interpretation is unclear.

Explore next step
Talk to Sorena
Talk through implementation

Review the module certificate, service evidence, approved indicators, and claim wording with Sorena.

Explore next step
Question 3

What mistakes should teams avoid?

Most approved-mode mistakes come from treating the mode as a switch that validates every cryptographic operation. FIPS 140-3 and the CMVP guidance require a more precise answer: which module, which service, which approved security function, which indicator, and which rule.

  • Do not use a global approved-mode indicator by itself when the module can run approved and non-approved security services concurrently or when not all approved services are configured for the mode.
  • Do not rely on narrative alone as the ; the indicator must be externally accessible from the module's status interface and verifiable by the operator.
  • Do not call a non-approved cryptographic algorithm an approved-mode security function just because it is present while the module is in .
  • Do not reuse evidence from another certificate, module version, operational environment, or service table unless the validated boundary and configuration match the claim.
Primary sources

References and citations

CMVP Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3
csrc.nist.gov4 citations
Referenced sections
  • Primary guidance for approved-mode service classification, approved security service indicators, Security Policy service lists, and non-approved algorithm treatment.
  • Grounds the distinction between approved mode, approved security services, service indicators, and services that are not available for approved-mode use.
  • Supports the Security Policy evidence requirements for service lists, indicators, and non-approved algorithms allowed in approved mode with no security claimed.
Show 1 more
  • Supports the cautions on global indicators, Security Policy-only explanations, non-approved algorithms, and disallowed non-approved security functions.
"approved security service indicator"
More quoted passages
"approved security services"
"complete list of all approved and non-approved services"
"does not fulfill the requirement"
NIST FIPS 140-3 security requirements for cryptographic modules
doi.org4 citations
Referenced sections
  • Primary standard source support for keeping approved-mode content tied to cryptographic modules and their required security areas.
  • Grounds the page scope: FIPS 140-3 applies to cryptographic modules and lists roles, services, authentication, self-tests, lifecycle assurance, and other module security requirement areas.
  • Supports the need to keep approved-mode evidence tied to the cryptographic module and its required security areas rather than to a whole product label.
Show 1 more
  • Supports keeping the approved-mode answer within the cryptographic module security requirements and validated configuration.
"security requirements for cryptographic modules"
More quoted passages
"secure design and implementation"
"operation of a cryptographic module"
NIST CAVP validation search
csrc.nist.gov2 citations
Referenced sections
  • Public search page for recording algorithm validation evidence when an approved security service depends on a tested algorithm implementation.
  • Public NIST search page for algorithm validation entries that can support service-level evidence when a FIPS 140-3 approved security service relies on a tested algorithm implementation.
"Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program"

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