FIPS 140-3 FAQ

FIPS 140-3 applies directly to U.S. federal agencies that use cryptography-based security systems to protect sensitive information, and it must be used for cryptographic modules operated by or for those agencies under contract. Private and commercial organizations can also adopt it, often because a customer, procurement clause, control framework, or regulated deployment requires validated cryptography.

The useful first question is therefore not whether a product uses encryption. It is whether a specific cryptographic module is being claimed for a FIPS 140-3 use case, which agency or customer requirement creates that need, and which module certificate or validation evidence supports the claim.

No. A CAVP certificate validates a cryptographic algorithm implementation; a CMVP certificate validates a cryptographic module. The CMVP implementation guidance separates these concepts and says the algorithm certificate identifies the validated algorithm implementation and tested operational environment, while the module certificate identifies the validated module and tested operational environment.

For evidence review, treat CAVP certificates as inputs to a module-validation case. They do not replace the CMVP module certificate, the module security policy, or the validation boundary that explains how the algorithms are used by the module.

A module-boundary answer should identify what is inside the cryptographic module, what is outside it, and which services, roles, interfaces, algorithms, sensitive security parameters, self-tests, and operational environments are part of the validated claim. This matters because FIPS 140-3 evaluates the secure design, implementation, and operation of a cryptographic module, not every surrounding product component.

If the module embeds or binds to another validated module, the evidence must keep the implementation under test separate from the existing validated module. The CMVP guidance says the security policy and validation test report must identify the existing module by name, certificate number, and version, and clearly separate services, algorithms, SSPs, self-tests, and zeroisation mechanisms.

Approved-mode claims should be tied to the module security policy, the service or API behavior that indicates approved algorithm use, and the certificates for the algorithms actually used by the module. The CMVP guidance includes an approved security service indicator topic and treats approved service indication as part of the module evidence, not a marketing label.

Operational-environment evidence should match the certificate claim. The CMVP guidance says a validated algorithm implementation embedded in a module must be unmodified and tested in an operational environment that is identical to, or fully included in, the module testing environment. For software modules, the listed environment includes operating system, platform, processor, and hypervisor when used.

A useful response should include the module name and version, CMVP certificate reference, security policy, claimed security levels, operational environment, approved and non-approved services, algorithm certificates, and any caveats that affect the deployment. For federal procurement, the FIPS 140-3 text points agencies to products on the CMVP validated modules list and warns that the historical list is for reference, not procurement decisions.

If the module relies on another validated module, include the bound or embedded module evidence and the security-policy markings that show exactly which functions came from that module. If the deployment changes software, firmware, processor architecture, operating system, hypervisor, boundary, or algorithm implementation, do not reuse the old evidence without checking whether the certificate scope still matches.