Validation ChecklistNIST/CMVPFIPS 140-3

FIPS 140-3 Validation checklist

A module-level checklist for preparing FIPS 140-3 validation evidence before CST laboratory testing and CMVP review.

Use it to test whether the module boundary, security level claims, services, algorithms, entropy evidence, self-tests, , and change records are ready for validation review.

Author
Sorena AI
Published
May 9, 2026
Updated
Oct 15, 2026
Overview

A module is ready to enter validation planning when the vendor can freeze and identify the , draw its cryptographic boundary, choose and justify the target security levels, map every service to its approved or non-approved treatment, and produce consistent and test evidence. Use this checklist before laboratory testing or before relying on a supplier claim. Passing an internal checklist does not produce a CMVP validation.

Section 1

Validation readiness gate

FIPS 140-3 applies to cryptographic modules used by federal agencies or operated for them under contract, and its adoption is also available to private and commercial organizations. CMVP validation is not a broad product certification; it validates the cryptographic module and gives procuring agencies a security metric for equipment containing validated modules.

Start the checklist only after the team can name the , the module type, the cryptographic boundary, and the intended security level claim. If the answer is still the whole product, a cloud service, or a library name without a boundary diagram, the validation package is not ready.

  • Confirm the module is hardware, software, firmware, hybrid, or another defined implementation covered by FIPS 140-3, not an undefined product bundle.
  • Record the federal contract, procurement requirement, customer assurance requirement, or internal policy reason that makes FIPS 140-3 validation relevant.
  • Choose the target security level by application and operating environment, then identify which requirement areas have level-specific obligations and which apply to all modules.
  • Assign the vendor owner, engineering owner, owner, and Cryptographic and Security Testing (CST) laboratory contact before evidence collection starts; record who can approve module changes while testing is underway.
Section 2

Module boundary and security level checklist

The boundary evidence should let a reviewer separate the validated module from surrounding product code, excluded components, embedded validated modules, and the operational environment. For binding or embedding cases, the implementation guidance expects clear identification of the and any external validated module the submission relies on.

Security level claims should be traceable to the FIPS 140-3 requirement areas, including module specification, interfaces, roles and authentication, software or firmware security, operating environment, physical security, non-invasive security, sensitive security parameter management, self-tests, life-cycle assurance, and mitigation of other attacks.

  • Attach a boundary diagram that labels the module, interfaces, ports, excluded components, and any embedded or bound validated module.
  • List the module version, firmware or software version, hardware platform, operating environment, processor accelerator assumptions, and configuration used for validation testing.
  • For each target security level, map every applicable requirement area to an assertion, expected test evidence, responsible owner, and unresolved gap instead of writing only an overall level claim.
  • If the module relies on an external validated module, record the external module name, CMVP certificate number, version, status, services used, algorithms used, movement, and self-test responsibility.
Section 3

Approved services, algorithms, entropy, and self-tests

FIPS 140-3 conforming modules must employ approved security functions, including approved algorithms, key-management techniques, and authentication techniques. The checklist should therefore tie every service table entry to approved-mode behavior, non-approved functions with no security claimed, or component validation evidence, and the wording that users will follow.

Entropy and self-test evidence should be checked early because they often affect the certificate, the , the test report, and the allowed approved mode. The CMVP implementation guidance covers entropy caveats, deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) evidence, cryptographic algorithm self-tests, periodic self-testing, error logging, and software or firmware loading distinctions.

For generation in approved mode, IG 9.3.A sets a concrete gate: if the known amount of entropy used to generate the SSP is less than 112 bits, the module cannot be validated. When the source is outside the Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter or the module only passively receives entropy, the applicable assurance caveat, minimum-input control, and operator guidance must also be captured; the exact branch depends on how the module obtains the entropy.

  • Build a services table that separates approved services, non-approved services, and non-approved algorithms allowed in approved mode with no security claimed.
  • For each approved service, list the algorithm, mode, key size or parameter set, certificate or Component Validation List (CVL) reference, operational environment, and approved service indicator.
  • For each entropy source, record the ESV or ENT evidence, physical or non-physical classification, credited entropy claim, DRBG seeding use, health tests, and any CMVP caveat needed on the certificate or .
  • Document pre-operational integrity tests, cryptographic algorithm self-tests, conditional self-tests, periodic self-tests, and error states in a way the CST laboratory can trace to the module behavior.
Section 4

Security policy and submission evidence

The is the public-facing control description that must stay aligned with the tested module. Before submission, compare the security policy, test report inputs, user guidance, crypto officer guidance, service tables, algorithm tables, entropy claims, and operational-environment listings for internal consistency.

FIPS 140-3 validation testing is performed by accredited CST laboratories, and a test report for modules demonstrating compliance is submitted to CMVP for review and validation. The schedule is coordination-dependent, so the checklist should focus on completeness and traceability rather than promising a fixed review duration.

Record the FIPS 140-3, SP 800-140-series, Implementation Guidance, Management Manual, template, and algorithm-transition editions used for the package. CMVP guidance and submission resources change; recheck the official CMVP pages before laboratory testing, submission, revalidation, and any material claim update.

  • Confirm the names the exact module, version, boundary, security levels, operational environments, roles, authentication mechanisms, services, approved algorithms, non-approved functions, handling, self-tests, and mitigation claims.
  • Check that every certificate-facing statement in the matches the validation evidence, including caveats for entropy, operational environment, processor acceleration, embedded modules, or algorithm transitions.
  • Prepare laboratory evidence for module specification, interfaces, roles and services, software or firmware integrity, operating environment, physical and non-invasive security where applicable, management, self-tests, life-cycle assurance, and other-attack mitigation.
  • Do not use the CMVP Historical list for procurement decisions; record active validation status when validation status is part of a procurement or customer assurance review.
Section 5

Change and maintenance checks

A validation checklist is incomplete if it stops at the first certificate. Module changes, excluded component changes, algorithm transitions, operational-environment changes, firmware or software loading changes, and embedded-module status changes can affect whether the validation evidence still matches the module being shipped.

Keep a maintenance record that separates changes requiring laboratory or CMVP review from ordinary engineering records. Unsupported statements such as "FIPS validated product" should be removed unless the shipped configuration matches the module certificate, boundary, version, caveats, and operating environment.

  • Trigger review when the cryptographic boundary, module version, operational environment, approved services, algorithm implementation, entropy source, self-test behavior, or text changes.
  • For excluded components inside the module boundary, treat modifications as validation-impacting until the lab confirms the revalidation path.
  • Re-check external validated module status and approved algorithm status when a submission relies on embedded or bound modules.
  • Keep customer and procurement claims tied to the module certificate and its caveats, not to a broader product name or marketing SKU.
Section 6

Checklist output record

Use the checklist result as a validation-readiness record. Each row should state the verifiable condition, responsible owner, expected evidence, source or assertion reference, result, exception or open question, and whether the issue blocks CST laboratory testing, CMVP submission, procurement reliance, or customer-facing claims.

  • Boundary and configuration: diagram, module name, module version, operational environment, excluded components, embedded or bound modules, and certificate dependencies.
  • Level and requirement map: selected security level by requirement area, evidence file, owner, and unresolved gap.
  • Services and algorithms: approved services, non-approved services, or CVL evidence, approved service indicators, non-approved algorithm handling, and cross-reference.
  • Entropy and self-tests: ESV or ENT evidence, DRBG use, health tests, cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs), integrity tests, error handling, and caveats.
  • Submission and maintenance: CST laboratory evidence package, CMVP submission assumptions, certificate status checks, change triggers, and public-claim approval.
Primary sources

References and citations

csrc.nist.gov7 citations
Referenced sections
  • Program guidance for validation evidence, binding and embedding, approved service indicators, CAVP certificates, entropy caveats, self-tests, security-policy consistency, and change impact.
  • Supports treating validation as a module submission with implementation guidance for boundaries, services, algorithm certificates, operational environments, entropy, self-tests, and security-policy detail.
  • Grounds the binding and embedding checks, including the need to identify external validated module certificate details and separate IUT information from EVM information.
Show 4 more
  • Supports the approved-service indicator, non-approved security-function, entropy caveat, DRBG, and self-test checklist items, including the IG 9.3.A rule that a known entropy amount below 112 bits cannot support SSP generation in an approved mode.
  • Supports security-policy checks for binding or embedding, approved service indicators, algorithm tables, entropy caveats, self-tests, and CMVP submission consistency.
  • Grounds the change-impact checks for excluded components, revalidation scenarios, embedded or bound modules, algorithm transitions, and operational-environment dependencies.
  • Provides program guidance for the evidence rows covering approved service indicators, CAVP certificates, entropy, self-tests, operational environments, and change impact.
doi.org7 citations
Referenced sections
  • Primary source for FIPS 140-3 applicability, module scope, security levels, requirement areas, approved security functions, CST laboratory testing, CMVP validation, and procurement cautions.
  • Supports the module-level scope, federal applicability, private-sector adoption language, security-level framing, and CMVP validation role.
  • Identifies the FIPS 140-3 requirement areas and the security-level model that the checklist maps into boundary evidence.
Show 4 more
  • Supports the requirement to use approved security functions and the checklist coverage of self-tests and sensitive security parameter management.
  • Supports the CST laboratory testing role, CMVP review and validation step, review-schedule caution, and procurement warning about the Historical list.
  • Supports tying validation claims to the cryptographic module and its tested application and environment rather than to an entire product line.
  • Provides the base standard for the checklist output categories: module scope, security levels, approved functions, self-tests, and CMVP validation.
"four increasing, qualitative levels of security"
csrc.nist.gov3 citations
Referenced sections
  • Public NIST search used to verify algorithm validation certificate evidence cited in the module services table.
  • Use to verify algorithm validation certificates and capture certificate evidence for the module service table.
  • Use to confirm algorithm certificate records referenced in the checklist output.
nist.gov2 citations
Referenced sections
  • Official CMVP program page referenced by FIPS 140-3 for cryptographic module validation program information.
  • Official CMVP program page referenced by FIPS 140-3 for program information and validation resources.
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