A module-level checklist for preparing FIPS 140-3 validation evidence before CST laboratory testing and CMVP review.
Use it to test whether the module boundary, security level claims, services, algorithms, entropy evidence, self-tests, security policy, and change records are ready for validation review.
A module is ready to enter validation planning when the vendor can freeze and identify the , draw its cryptographic boundary, choose and justify the target security levels, map every service to its approved or non-approved treatment, and produce consistent and test evidence. Use this checklist before laboratory testing or before relying on a supplier claim. Passing an internal checklist does not produce a CMVP validation.
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Section 1
Validation readiness gate
FIPS 140-3 applies to cryptographic modules used by federal agencies or operated for them under contract, and its adoption is also available to private and commercial organizations. CMVP validation is not a broad product certification; it validates the cryptographic module and gives procuring agencies a security metric for equipment containing validated modules.
Start the checklist only after the team can name the , the module type, the cryptographic boundary, and the intended security level claim. If the answer is still the whole product, a cloud service, or a library name without a boundary diagram, the validation package is not ready.
Confirm the module is hardware, software, firmware, hybrid, or another defined implementation covered by FIPS 140-3, not an undefined product bundle.
Record the federal contract, procurement requirement, customer assurance requirement, or internal policy reason that makes FIPS 140-3 validation relevant.
Choose the target security level by application and operating environment, then identify which requirement areas have level-specific obligations and which apply to all modules.
Assign the vendor owner, engineering owner, owner, and CST laboratory contact before evidence collection starts; record who can approve module changes while testing is underway.
The boundary evidence should let a reviewer separate the validated module from surrounding product code, excluded components, embedded validated modules, and the operational environment. For binding or embedding cases, the implementation guidance expects clear identification of the and any external validated module the submission relies on.
Security level claims should be traceable to the FIPS 140-3 requirement areas, including module specification, interfaces, roles and authentication, software or firmware security, operating environment, physical security, non-invasive security, sensitive security parameter management, self-tests, life-cycle assurance, and mitigation of other attacks.
Attach a boundary diagram that labels the module, interfaces, ports, excluded components, and any embedded or bound validated module.
List the module version, firmware or software version, hardware platform, operating environment, processor accelerator assumptions, and configuration used for validation testing.
For each target security level, map every applicable requirement area to an assertion, expected test evidence, responsible owner, and unresolved gap instead of writing only an overall level claim.
If the module relies on an external validated module, record the external module name, CMVP certificate number, version, status, services used, algorithms used, movement, and self-test responsibility.
Use the checklist to assign module-boundary, algorithm, entropy, self-test, security-policy, and change-impact gaps before laboratory testing or procurement review.
Approved services, algorithms, entropy, and self-tests
FIPS 140-3 conforming modules must employ approved security functions, including approved algorithms, key-management techniques, and authentication techniques. The checklist should therefore tie every service table entry to approved-mode behavior, non-approved functions with no security claimed, or component validation evidence, and the wording that users will follow.
Entropy and self-test evidence should be checked early because they often affect the certificate, the , the test report, and the allowed approved mode. The CMVP implementation guidance covers entropy caveats, DRBG-related evidence, cryptographic algorithm self-tests, periodic self-testing, error logging, and software or firmware loading distinctions.
For generation in approved mode, IG 9.3.A sets a concrete gate: if the known amount of entropy used to generate the SSP is less than 112 bits, the module cannot be validated. When the source is outside the Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter or the module only passively receives entropy, the applicable assurance caveat, minimum-input control, and operator guidance must also be captured; the exact branch depends on how the module obtains the entropy.
Build a services table that separates approved services, non-approved services, and non-approved algorithms allowed in approved mode with no security claimed.
For each approved service, list the algorithm, mode, key size or parameter set, certificate or CVL reference, operational environment, and approved service indicator.
For each entropy source, record the ESV or ENT evidence, physical or non-physical classification, credited entropy claim, DRBG seeding use, health tests, and any CMVP caveat needed on the certificate or .
Document pre-operational integrity tests, cryptographic algorithm self-tests, conditional self-tests, periodic self-tests, and error states in a way the CST laboratory can trace to the module behavior.
The is the public-facing control description that must stay aligned with the tested module. Before submission, compare the security policy, test report inputs, user guidance, crypto officer guidance, service tables, algorithm tables, entropy claims, and operational-environment listings for internal consistency.
FIPS 140-3 validation testing is performed by accredited CST laboratories, and a test report for modules demonstrating compliance is submitted to CMVP for review and validation. The schedule is coordination-dependent, so the checklist should focus on completeness and traceability rather than promising a fixed review duration.
Record the FIPS 140-3, SP 800-140-series, Implementation Guidance, Management Manual, template, and algorithm-transition editions used for the package. CMVP guidance and submission resources change; recheck the official CMVP pages before laboratory testing, submission, revalidation, and any material claim update.
Confirm the names the exact module, version, boundary, security levels, operational environments, roles, authentication mechanisms, services, approved algorithms, non-approved functions, handling, self-tests, and mitigation claims.
Check that every certificate-facing statement in the matches the validation evidence, including caveats for entropy, operational environment, processor acceleration, embedded modules, or algorithm transitions.
Prepare laboratory evidence for module specification, interfaces, roles and services, software or firmware integrity, operating environment, physical and non-invasive security where applicable, management, self-tests, life-cycle assurance, and other-attack mitigation.
Do not use the CMVP Historical list for procurement decisions; record active validation status when validation status is part of a procurement or customer assurance review.
A validation checklist is incomplete if it stops at the first certificate. Module changes, excluded component changes, algorithm transitions, operational-environment changes, firmware or software loading changes, and embedded-module status changes can affect whether the validation evidence still matches the module being shipped.
Keep a maintenance record that separates changes requiring laboratory or CMVP review from ordinary engineering records. Unsupported statements such as "FIPS validated product" should be removed unless the shipped configuration matches the module certificate, boundary, version, caveats, and operating environment.
Trigger review when the cryptographic boundary, module version, operational environment, approved services, algorithm implementation, entropy source, self-test behavior, or text changes.
For excluded components inside the module boundary, treat modifications as validation-impacting until the lab confirms the revalidation path.
Re-check external validated module status and approved algorithm status when a submission relies on embedded or bound modules.
Keep customer and procurement claims tied to the module certificate and its caveats, not to a broader product name or marketing SKU.
Use the checklist result as a validation-readiness record. Each row should state the verifiable condition, responsible owner, expected evidence, source or assertion reference, result, exception or open question, and whether the issue blocks CST laboratory testing, CMVP submission, procurement reliance, or customer-facing claims.
Boundary and configuration: diagram, module name, module version, operational environment, excluded components, embedded or bound modules, and certificate dependencies.
Level and requirement map: selected security level by requirement area, evidence file, owner, and unresolved gap.
Services and algorithms: approved services, non-approved services, or CVL evidence, approved service indicators, non-approved algorithm handling, and cross-reference.
Entropy and self-tests: ESV or ENT evidence, DRBG use, health tests, CASTs, integrity tests, error handling, and caveats.
Submission and maintenance: CST laboratory evidence package, CMVP submission assumptions, certificate status checks, change triggers, and public-claim approval.
Provides program guidance for the evidence rows covering approved service indicators, CAVP certificates, entropy, self-tests, operational environments, and change impact.