FAQGLOBALFIPS 140-3

FIPS 140-3 Algorithm certificates FAQ

Use algorithm certificates as scoped evidence for tested cryptographic algorithm implementations inside a FIPS 140-3 module claim.

This page explains what to check before reusing an in module evidence, customer responses, or procurement reviews.

Author
Sorena AI
Published
May 9, 2026
Updated
Oct 15, 2026
Overview

Short answer: an is evidence that a particular cryptographic algorithm implementation was tested by for a stated implementation version and operational environment. It does not by itself prove that a product or module is validated to FIPS 140-3 under .

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4 of 4 questions
Question 1

What does an algorithm certificate prove under FIPS 140-3?

A supports the algorithm part of a FIPS 140-3 evidence package. It shows that the named implementation was tested for the algorithm capabilities and operational environments recorded by CAVP. An accredited Cryptographic and Security Testing (CST) laboratory separately tests the cryptographic module that integrates and uses that implementation, and reviews and validates the submission.

That distinction matters in public claims. A product team should not describe a product as FIPS 140-3 validated merely because one embedded algorithm has a certificate. The module still needs its own validation record and Security Policy for the claimed module boundary.

  • Use the certificate to identify the tested algorithm implementation, implementation version, and operational environment.
  • Use the module certificate and Security Policy to support a FIPS 140-3 module-validation claim.
  • Keep customer and procurement wording separate: -tested algorithm implementation is not the same claim as -validated cryptographic module.
Question 2

What should I check before reusing a certificate in module evidence?

Check the certificate number, algorithm capabilities and parameters, implementation version, and tested operational environment, then compare those details with the module configuration that will rely on the algorithm. IG 2.3.A requires the validated implementation to remain unmodified after integration and its environment to be identical to, or fully included in, the module's tested environment.

For software, firmware, and hybrid modules, the tested operational environment matters. If the algorithm was tested on a different operating system, processor, platform, or hypervisor arrangement, do not assume the certificate automatically covers the module under test.

  • Compare the certificate's implementation name and version with the implementation shipped in the module.
  • Compare the certificate's operating system, platform, processor, and hypervisor details with the module's tested operational environment.
  • Treat changed code, changed processor bit size, changed operating system, or changed hardware implementation as a reason to re-check testing coverage.
Question 3

What evidence should be kept with algorithm certificates?

Keep enough evidence to show why the certificate supports the current module claim. Connect the entry to the module boundary, the Security Policy table or service row where the algorithm is used, required self-tests, and the operational environment tested for the module. A certificate for an approved algorithm does not make every parameter, mode, protocol use, or service approved.

Do not use stale certificate screenshots as the only evidence. Keep the public URL, certificate number, algorithm and implementation identifiers, module certificate or submission reference, Security Policy excerpt, and the date the evidence was checked.

  • Record the certificate number, algorithm name, implementation name, implementation version, and tested operational environment.
  • Map each certificate to the module service or Security Policy row that relies on that algorithm implementation.
  • Re-check the evidence when the algorithm implementation, module version, operating environment, processor acceleration path, supplier component, or module status changes.
  • For processor algorithm acceleration (PAA) or processor algorithm implementation (PAI) use, verify whether the guidance requires testing in both software/firmware-only execution and accelerated execution.
Question 4

Questions and answers

Does a prove FIPS 140-3 module validation?

No. A certificate validates an algorithm implementation, while validates the cryptographic module. Use the as supporting evidence, but rely on the module certificate and Security Policy for the actual FIPS 140-3 claim.

What should I compare before reusing an in module evidence?

Compare the algorithm implementation name and version, the certificate number, and the tested operational environment against the module configuration that will rely on it. If the operating system, platform, processor, hypervisor, or code changed, re-check the claim instead of assuming reuse is valid.

What evidence should be kept with an ?

Keep the public URL, certificate number, algorithm and implementation identifiers, module certificate or submission reference, Security Policy excerpt, and the date the evidence was checked. That record should show why the certificate supports the current module claim.

Primary sources

References and citations

csrc.nist.gov4 citations
Referenced sections
  • Primary guidance for algorithm certificate reuse, operational environments, and module evidence.
  • Supports the distinction between CAVP testing for algorithm implementations and CMVP validation for cryptographic modules.
  • Grounds the reuse rule for binding cryptographic algorithm validation certificates to modules under test.
Show 1 more
  • Supports evidence fields for certificate binding, operating environment checks, and PAA/PAI testing considerations.
"the validation certificate serves as a benchmark"
More quoted passages
"Cryptographic algorithm implementations are tested and validated under the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program"
"has not been modified upon integration into the cryptographic module"
"the tested operational environment"
csrc.nist.gov4 citations
Referenced sections
  • Public search page for checking CAVP algorithm validation records referenced in module evidence.
  • Public NIST search page for checking algorithm validation records used as supporting evidence.
  • Public lookup for confirming the certificate entry, algorithm name, implementation details, and listed operating environment.
Show 1 more
  • This source helps re-check the public certificate entry instead of relying only on copied text or screenshots.
"Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program"
doi.org3 citations
Referenced sections
  • Primary standard source support for keeping algorithm-certificate claims tied to cryptographic modules and their required security areas.
  • Explains that CMVP validates cryptographic modules and that validated modules are the procurement metric for agencies.
  • Supports retaining module-level CMVP validation evidence separately from algorithm-certificate evidence.
"security requirements for cryptographic modules"
More quoted passages
"A test report for modules demonstrating compliance will be submitted to the CMVP"
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