Cyber Resilience Act comparison CRA vs UK PSTI Act
Use separate scope tests and legal evidence for the EU CRA and the UK PSTI product-security regime, even when the same engineering controls support both.
The UK regime has applied since 29 April 2024 to relevant UK consumer connectable products. Most CRA product duties apply from 11 December 2027, with Article 14 reporting from 11 September 2026.
The EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) and the UK Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (PSTI) product-security regime can both apply to one connected product, but they answer different legal questions. The CRA broadly covers products with digital elements made available on the EU market and imposes lifecycle, conformity, support, vulnerability-handling, and reporting duties. The UK regime applies to relevant connectable products made available to UK consumers, subject to statutory scope conditions and excepted products. It currently specifies three baseline security requirements, generally requires a to accompany the product, subject to the specific Schedule 2A deemed-compliance route, and gives manufacturers, importers, and distributors separate supply-chain duties.
Side-by-side comparison
EU CRA vs UK PSTI product-security regime
Use the matrix to separate product scope, actors, security duties, evidence, dates, and enforcement before reusing technical controls across the EU and UK.
CRA applies to products with digital elements made available on the Union market whose intended purpose or reasonably foreseeable use includes a direct or indirect logical or physical data connection to a device or network. Covered software, hardware, separately placed components, and necessary remote data-processing solutions remain subject to exclusions and special rules.
Covers a relevant connectable product that meets the UK consumer conditions in section 54. A relevant connectable product is an internet-connectable or network-connectable product that is not an excepted product.
Official guidance listing current scope examples and excluded or excepted product categories.
Run both tests. CRA can cover non-consumer software and hardware outside PSTI scope; PSTI turns on statutory connectability, UK consumer-market facts, and listed exceptions.
CRA assigns duties to manufacturers, importers, and distributors; authorised representatives perform tasks under a written mandate. Importers, distributors, or other persons can become manufacturers under Articles 21 and 22. Article 24 gives open-source software stewards a separate, limited set of obligations.
Articles 13 and 18 to 24 distinguish manufacturers, representatives, importers, distributors, persons assuming manufacturer duties, and open-source software stewards.
Manufacturers must meet the applicable security requirements and statement duties. Importers and distributors have their own supply and compliance-failure duties: check the accompanying statement or, where Schedule 2A applies, be satisfied that the specified conditions are met.
Paragraphs 1 to 3 treat manufacturer section 9(2) as met for current, unexpired Japan JC-STAR STAR-1 or Singapore Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme labels; read with Act sections 15(5) and 22(3) for importers and distributors.
Map the legal entity and role in each market. Shared corporate ownership does not make the EU manufacturer, EU importer, UK manufacturer, and UK importer the same legal actor.
Binding source for manufacturer, importer, distributor, authorised-representative, statement, investigation, notification, remediation, and record duties.
CRA manufacturers must address Annex I product-security and vulnerability-handling requirements through risk-based design, development, production, maintenance, vulnerability remediation, security updates, component documentation, and required user information throughout the applicable support period.
Article 13 and Annex I set risk-based product-security and vulnerability-handling duties.
The current specified requirements cover passwords, publication of a vulnerability-reporting route and response times, and publication of a minimum security-update period with an end date. Schedule 2 specifies security-requirement deemed-compliance routes; Schedule 2A separately governs deemed compliance with the manufacturer statement-accompaniment duty.
Paragraphs 1 to 3 treat manufacturer section 9(2) as met for current, unexpired Japan JC-STAR STAR-1 or Singapore Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme labels; read with Act sections 15(5) and 22(3) for importers and distributors.
Reuse test and process evidence only after mapping it to the exact CRA requirement and UK Schedule 1 requirement. Keep the CRA conformity artifacts and UK separate.
CRA Chapter IV applies from 11 June 2026, Article 14 reporting applies from 11 September 2026, and the general application date is 11 December 2027. Under Article 69, products placed on the market before 11 December 2027 are generally subject to the other requirements only if substantially modified from that date; Article 14 reporting also covers earlier in-scope products.
Binding EU source for 11 June 2026, 11 September 2026, and 11 December 2027 CRA dates.
Article 14 shall apply from 11 September 2026
The UK product-security regime came into force on 29 April 2024. The 2025 vehicle exceptions took effect on 25 February 2025, and further deemed-compliance amendments took effect on 4 December 2025.
Binding source for the deemed-compliance amendments in force from 4 December 2025.
Use 29 April 2024 for current UK supply decisions. Use the CRA's staged dates only for EU duties, and check later UK amendments when relying on an exception or deemed-compliance route.
CRA records include the cybersecurity risk assessment, Annex I mapping, vulnerability-handling process, software bill of materials, support-period rationale, test results, technical documentation, conformity-assessment records, EU declaration of conformity, and CE-marking evidence. Retention periods and responsibilities follow the applicable operator duty.
Article 13 and Annex VII specify manufacturer evidence, technical documentation, conformity outputs, and record retention.
Where required, the manufacturer prepares the Schedule 4 statement and it accompanies the product; manufacturers and importers retain it for the longer of 10 years from issue or the defined support period. Schedule 2A treats section 9(2) as met for a current, unexpired Japan JC-STAR STAR-1 conformance label or a current, unexpired Singapore Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme label at any level. Sections 15(5) and 22(3) require importers and distributors to be satisfied that those conditions are met; section 15(5) also disapplies importer statement retention on that route.
Paragraphs 1 to 3 treat manufacturer section 9(2) as met for current, unexpired Japan JC-STAR STAR-1 or Singapore Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme labels; read with Act sections 15(5) and 22(3) for importers and distributors.
A CRA declaration or CE mark does not replace the UK statement. The UK statement is also not a CRA conformity assessment or third-party approval.
CRA enforcement can involve market-surveillance authorities, corrective action, restriction or withdrawal of products, and administrative fines under the CRA enforcement framework.
OPSS can use information, compliance, stop, and recall measures and monetary penalties. The statutory penalty maximum is the greater of GBP 10 million and 4% of qualifying worldwide revenue, subject to the Act's calculation rules.
Use CRA sources when the decision turns on EU scope, Annex I requirements, vulnerability handling, support period, Article 14 reporting, technical documentation, conformity assessment, EU declaration of conformity, CE marking, or CRA enforcement.
Use the PSTI Act, the revised 2023 Regulations, and current OPSS or DSIT guidance for UK scope, requirements, statements, actors, dates, penalties, and enforcement powers.
Current revised text for the specified requirements, exceptions, statements, retention, and deemed-compliance provisions.
Build shared product-security controls, then issue separate EU CRA and UK PSTI conclusions with their own evidence indexes, responsible actors, and release gates.
CRA Annex I covers controls such as secure credentials and configuration, vulnerability handling, security updates, and user security information. These can share engineering evidence with the UK baseline, while the CRA also requires broader risk, lifecycle, technical-documentation, and conformity work.
Annex I supplies the shared technical controls; Articles 13 and 31 to 34 add lifecycle and conformity requirements.
PSTI overlaps technically through credentials, vulnerability reporting, and update-support information, but its current statutory baseline is narrower than the CRA lifecycle and conformity framework.
Binding source for the three specified security requirements.
Reuse a control only where the evidence satisfies both mapped requirements. Do not infer PSTI scope from CRA scope, infer CRA conformity from the three UK requirements, or use either regime's declaration as the other's legal artifact.
Apply Article 2 scope and exclusions, identify the economic operator and product category, and use Articles 69 and 71 for the applicable transition and date. Then map Annex I requirements, support, Article 14 reporting, technical documentation, conformity assessment, declaration, and CE marking for that product and actor.
Articles 2, 13, 14, 19 to 24, 69 and 71 govern the scope, role, duty and timing sequence.
If the item is a relevant connectable product, apply the section 54 UK consumer test and Schedule 3 exceptions. Then identify the actors, security requirements, statement or Schedule 2A route, applicable retention, and compliance-failure duties.
Paragraphs 1 to 3 treat manufacturer section 9(2) as met for current, unexpired Japan JC-STAR STAR-1 or Singapore Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme labels; read with Act sections 15(5) and 22(3) for importers and distributors.
Record separate pass or fail decisions for EU CRA scope and UK PSTI scope. A dual-market release needs both evidence indexes when both tests pass.
Binding source for the UK scope and actor sequence.
Scope boundary
EU Cyber Resilience Act
CRA applies to products with digital elements made available on the Union market whose intended purpose or reasonably foreseeable use includes a direct or indirect logical or physical data connection to a device or network. Covered software, hardware, separately placed components, and necessary remote data-processing solutions remain subject to exclusions and special rules.
Covers a relevant connectable product that meets the UK consumer conditions in section 54. A relevant connectable product is an internet-connectable or network-connectable product that is not an excepted product.
Official guidance listing current scope examples and excluded or excepted product categories.
Operational implication
Run both tests. CRA can cover non-consumer software and hardware outside PSTI scope; PSTI turns on statutory connectability, UK consumer-market facts, and listed exceptions.
Sections 4, 5 and 54 establish the relevant-connectable-product and UK-consumer scope tests.
Covered actors
EU Cyber Resilience Act
CRA assigns duties to manufacturers, importers, and distributors; authorised representatives perform tasks under a written mandate. Importers, distributors, or other persons can become manufacturers under Articles 21 and 22. Article 24 gives open-source software stewards a separate, limited set of obligations.
Articles 13 and 18 to 24 distinguish manufacturers, representatives, importers, distributors, persons assuming manufacturer duties, and open-source software stewards.
UK PSTI Act
Manufacturers must meet the applicable security requirements and statement duties. Importers and distributors have their own supply and compliance-failure duties: check the accompanying statement or, where Schedule 2A applies, be satisfied that the specified conditions are met.
Paragraphs 1 to 3 treat manufacturer section 9(2) as met for current, unexpired Japan JC-STAR STAR-1 or Singapore Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme labels; read with Act sections 15(5) and 22(3) for importers and distributors.
Operational implication
Map the legal entity and role in each market. Shared corporate ownership does not make the EU manufacturer, EU importer, UK manufacturer, and UK importer the same legal actor.
Binding source for manufacturer, importer, distributor, authorised-representative, statement, investigation, notification, remediation, and record duties.
Required security work
EU Cyber Resilience Act
CRA manufacturers must address Annex I product-security and vulnerability-handling requirements through risk-based design, development, production, maintenance, vulnerability remediation, security updates, component documentation, and required user information throughout the applicable support period.
Article 13 and Annex I set risk-based product-security and vulnerability-handling duties.
UK PSTI Act
The current specified requirements cover passwords, publication of a vulnerability-reporting route and response times, and publication of a minimum security-update period with an end date. Schedule 2 specifies security-requirement deemed-compliance routes; Schedule 2A separately governs deemed compliance with the manufacturer statement-accompaniment duty.
Paragraphs 1 to 3 treat manufacturer section 9(2) as met for current, unexpired Japan JC-STAR STAR-1 or Singapore Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme labels; read with Act sections 15(5) and 22(3) for importers and distributors.
Operational implication
Reuse test and process evidence only after mapping it to the exact CRA requirement and UK Schedule 1 requirement. Keep the CRA conformity artifacts and UK separate.
Supports separating CRA conformity evidence from other regulatory evidence.
CE marking
Application dates
EU Cyber Resilience Act
CRA Chapter IV applies from 11 June 2026, Article 14 reporting applies from 11 September 2026, and the general application date is 11 December 2027. Under Article 69, products placed on the market before 11 December 2027 are generally subject to the other requirements only if substantially modified from that date; Article 14 reporting also covers earlier in-scope products.
Binding EU source for 11 June 2026, 11 September 2026, and 11 December 2027 CRA dates.
Article 14 shall apply from 11 September 2026
UK PSTI Act
The UK product-security regime came into force on 29 April 2024. The 2025 vehicle exceptions took effect on 25 February 2025, and further deemed-compliance amendments took effect on 4 December 2025.
Binding source for the deemed-compliance amendments in force from 4 December 2025.
Operational implication
Use 29 April 2024 for current UK supply decisions. Use the CRA's staged dates only for EU duties, and check later UK amendments when relying on an exception or deemed-compliance route.
CRA records include the cybersecurity risk assessment, Annex I mapping, vulnerability-handling process, software bill of materials, support-period rationale, test results, technical documentation, conformity-assessment records, EU declaration of conformity, and CE-marking evidence. Retention periods and responsibilities follow the applicable operator duty.
Article 13 and Annex VII specify manufacturer evidence, technical documentation, conformity outputs, and record retention.
UK PSTI Act
Where required, the manufacturer prepares the Schedule 4 statement and it accompanies the product; manufacturers and importers retain it for the longer of 10 years from issue or the defined support period. Schedule 2A treats section 9(2) as met for a current, unexpired Japan JC-STAR STAR-1 conformance label or a current, unexpired Singapore Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme label at any level. Sections 15(5) and 22(3) require importers and distributors to be satisfied that those conditions are met; section 15(5) also disapplies importer statement retention on that route.
Paragraphs 1 to 3 treat manufacturer section 9(2) as met for current, unexpired Japan JC-STAR STAR-1 or Singapore Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme labels; read with Act sections 15(5) and 22(3) for importers and distributors.
Operational implication
A CRA declaration or CE mark does not replace the UK statement. The UK statement is also not a CRA conformity assessment or third-party approval.
Commission overview states that products will bear CE marking to indicate compliance with CRA requirements.
CE marking
Enforcement exposure
EU Cyber Resilience Act
CRA enforcement can involve market-surveillance authorities, corrective action, restriction or withdrawal of products, and administrative fines under the CRA enforcement framework.
OPSS can use information, compliance, stop, and recall measures and monetary penalties. The statutory penalty maximum is the greater of GBP 10 million and 4% of qualifying worldwide revenue, subject to the Act's calculation rules.
Primary source for CRA market surveillance, corrective actions, restrictions, withdrawals, and penalties.
market surveillance
Which legal sources to use
EU Cyber Resilience Act
Use CRA sources when the decision turns on EU scope, Annex I requirements, vulnerability handling, support period, Article 14 reporting, technical documentation, conformity assessment, EU declaration of conformity, CE marking, or CRA enforcement.
Use the PSTI Act, the revised 2023 Regulations, and current OPSS or DSIT guidance for UK scope, requirements, statements, actors, dates, penalties, and enforcement powers.
Current revised text for the specified requirements, exceptions, statements, retention, and deemed-compliance provisions.
Operational implication
Build shared product-security controls, then issue separate EU CRA and UK PSTI conclusions with their own evidence indexes, responsible actors, and release gates.
CRA Annex I covers controls such as secure credentials and configuration, vulnerability handling, security updates, and user security information. These can share engineering evidence with the UK baseline, while the CRA also requires broader risk, lifecycle, technical-documentation, and conformity work.
Annex I supplies the shared technical controls; Articles 13 and 31 to 34 add lifecycle and conformity requirements.
UK PSTI Act
PSTI overlaps technically through credentials, vulnerability reporting, and update-support information, but its current statutory baseline is narrower than the CRA lifecycle and conformity framework.
Binding source for the three specified security requirements.
Operational implication
Reuse a control only where the evidence satisfies both mapped requirements. Do not infer PSTI scope from CRA scope, infer CRA conformity from the three UK requirements, or use either regime's declaration as the other's legal artifact.
Binding source for the current UK requirements and evidence duties.
Practical decision rule
EU Cyber Resilience Act
Apply Article 2 scope and exclusions, identify the economic operator and product category, and use Articles 69 and 71 for the applicable transition and date. Then map Annex I requirements, support, Article 14 reporting, technical documentation, conformity assessment, declaration, and CE marking for that product and actor.
Articles 2, 13, 14, 19 to 24, 69 and 71 govern the scope, role, duty and timing sequence.
UK PSTI Act
If the item is a relevant connectable product, apply the section 54 UK consumer test and Schedule 3 exceptions. Then identify the actors, security requirements, statement or Schedule 2A route, applicable retention, and compliance-failure duties.
Paragraphs 1 to 3 treat manufacturer section 9(2) as met for current, unexpired Japan JC-STAR STAR-1 or Singapore Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme labels; read with Act sections 15(5) and 22(3) for importers and distributors.
Operational implication
Record separate pass or fail decisions for EU CRA scope and UK PSTI scope. A dual-market release needs both evidence indexes when both tests pass.
Binding source for the UK scope and actor sequence.
Practical decision rule
How to use this comparison
Use the CRA column as the cited EU work plan for products with digital elements.
Use the UK PSTI column to test connectability, UK consumer-market status, exceptions, actors, the three specified requirements, the , and supply-chain duties.
Reuse engineering controls where they genuinely overlap: credentials, vulnerability disclosure, updates, secure configuration, dependency tracking, and support-period communication.
Keep the CRA technical documentation and declaration separate from the UK , even where both cite the same test or control evidence.
Primary source for current UK requirements, exceptions, statement details, retention, and deemed compliance.
1
Section 1
Start with two separate scope tests
For the CRA, ask whether a software or hardware product, separately placed component, or necessary remote data-processing solution is a product with digital elements made available on the Union market whose intended purpose or reasonably foreseeable use includes a direct or indirect logical or physical data connection to a device or network. Then check the CRA's exclusions and special rules. A consumer purpose or internet connection is not required in every CRA case.
For UK PSTI, ask whether the item is an internet-connectable or network-connectable product under sections 4 and 5 of the Act, whether it is or will be a under section 54, and whether Schedule 3 to the 2023 Regulations excepts it. The government guidance lists medical devices, smart meter products, electric-vehicle charge points, certain computers without cellular connectivity, specified Northern Ireland supplies, and, since 25 February 2025, specified vehicle categories among the exclusions or exceptions. Apply the exact legal conditions rather than relying on those labels alone.
A business-only product can still be a when identical products are also made available to UK consumers and the section 54 conditions are met.
A general-purpose software product may enter CRA scope but not UK PSTI scope because the UK definition turns on a connectable product and the consumer-market conditions.
A cellular tablet or a computer designed exclusively for children under 14 does not fall within the specific non-cellular computer exception described in the UK guidance.
Record the scope conclusion, excluded-product analysis, intended markets, and first supply or market-placement facts for each product.
Recommended next step
Separate CRA evidence from UK PSTI evidence
Use separate scope decisions, actor maps, and evidence indexes for the EU CRA and UK PSTI regime, then link any shared test or control to the requirement it supports in each market.
A CRA manufacturer must connect its cybersecurity risk assessment to the Annex I product-security and vulnerability-handling requirements, establish a support period, prepare technical documentation, complete the applicable conformity assessment, issue an EU declaration of conformity, affix CE marking, provide required user information, and meet the CRA's reporting and cooperation duties.
A UK PSTI manufacturer must meet the applicable Schedule 1 security requirements. Passwords must meet the specified unique-per-product or user-defined rules. The manufacturer must publish, free of charge and without prior request, clear English information on how to report security issues and the expected acknowledgement and status-update times. It must also publish the minimum security-update period, including an end date, in clear English that a non-technical reader can understand.
Before making an in-scope product available in the UK, the manufacturer generally must ensure that a accompanies it. The statement contains the Schedule 4 information and may be digital if it still accompanies the product and meets the legal requirements. Schedule 2 provides routes for deemed compliance with the security requirements; using one does not by itself remove the statement duty. Regulation 4A and Schedule 2A separately treat section 9(2) as met when the product has a current, unexpired Japan JC-STAR STAR-1 conformance label or a current, unexpired label at any level of the Singapore Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme. Importers and distributors relying on that route must be satisfied that its conditions are met under sections 15(5) and 22(3).
CRA evidence: risk assessment, Annex I mapping, vulnerability-handling records, component information including an SBOM where required, support-period rationale, tests, technical documentation, conformity decision, declaration, CE marking, and Article 14 reporting process.
UK PSTI evidence: product-scope analysis, Schedule 1 control evidence, published vulnerability-reporting information, published security-update end date, , supply-chain checks, and records of any compliance failure and response.
UK statement retention: where a statement is required, manufacturers and importers keep a copy for the longer of 10 years from issue or the defined support period. Section 15(5) disapplies the importer statement and retention duties where the specified deemed-compliance route applies and the importer is satisfied that its conditions are met.
Do not state that the UK rules require security updates for a fixed statutory minimum duration. They require the manufacturer to define and publish the minimum period; other legal or contractual duties may affect what duration is adequate.
3
Section 3
Supply-chain and enforcement differences
Both regimes assign duties beyond the manufacturer, but the checks and documents differ. CRA importers and distributors verify specified CRA conformity and traceability matters and must respond to suspected non-conformity. Under PSTI, importers and distributors generally must not make an in-scope product available unless the required statement accompanies it. Under sections 15(5) and 22(3), where the Schedule 2A route applies, they must instead be satisfied that its conditions are met. The Act also sets investigation, notification, remediation, prevention, and record duties for compliance failures.
EU market-surveillance authorities enforce the CRA. In the UK, the Office for Product Safety and Standards (OPSS) enforces the PSTI product-security regime. UK powers include compliance, stop, and recall notices, information requirements, and monetary penalties. The statutory maximum for a penalty is the greater of GBP 10 million and 4% of qualifying worldwide revenue, subject to the Act's calculation rules; that is a maximum, not an automatic fine.
Share technical evidence for credentials, vulnerability intake, update delivery, secure configuration, dependency tracking, and support commitments where it proves the relevant requirement.
Keep legal outputs separate: a CRA technical file, EU declaration, and CE mark do not replace the UK .
Keep incident and defect workflows separate: CRA Article 14 notifications follow the CRA triggers and reporting platform, while PSTI compliance-failure duties follow the UK Act.
Name the manufacturer, importer, distributor, and any authorised representative for each market; do not assume that one entity has the same legal role in both regimes.
4
Section 4
Practical dual-market approach
Start with one product-security baseline, then create separate EU and UK evidence indexes. Shared tests can reduce duplicate engineering work, but every legal conclusion must point to the correct instrument and actor.
The UK regime has applied since 29 April 2024. CRA Article 14 reporting applies from 11 September 2026, and most CRA product and conformity duties apply from 11 December 2027. Under Article 69, products placed on the market before 11 December 2027 are generally subject to the other requirements only if substantially modified from that date; Article 14 reporting also covers earlier in-scope products. Use the actual supply, placement, modification, and reporting facts rather than the model's original launch date.
Create one security-control register for credentials, updates, vulnerability disclosure, secure configuration, dependency tracking, and support commitments.
Create a CRA evidence index for Annex I mappings, support-period rationale, SBOM or dependency evidence, test results, technical documentation, conformity documents, and reporting readiness.
Create a UK PSTI evidence index for scope, exceptions, actor roles, password design, vulnerability-reporting publication, security-update end date, , retention, and compliance-failure handling.
Release to each market only after that market's scope, actor, date, evidence, and accompanying-document checks are complete.
Binding UK source for the security requirements, exceptions, statement contents and retention, commencement date, and deemed-compliance provisions as amended.
Binding source for Schedule 1 security requirements, Schedule 4 statement information, and deemed-compliance provisions.
Regulation 1 gives the 29 April 2024 commencement date and the revised text records later amendments.
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Regulations 7 to 9 and the schedules govern statement information and retention.
Current revised text for the specified requirements, exceptions, statements, retention, and deemed-compliance provisions.
Binding source for the three specified security requirements.
Binding source for the current UK requirements and evidence duties.
Binding source for exceptions, security requirements, statements, and retention.
Primary source for current UK requirements, exceptions, statement details, retention, and deemed compliance.
Official guidance on current scope examples and exceptions, actor roles, the three security requirements, statements of compliance, OPSS enforcement, and the vehicle exceptions effective from 25 February 2025.
Official guidance listing current scope examples and excluded or excepted product categories.
Explains that the statement may be digital if it accompanies the product and satisfies the legal requirements.
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Supports the separate UK evidence and actor checks.
Explains the operational UK control and statement requirements.
Supports the practical UK scope, requirement, and statement checks.
Binding UK source for connectable-product and consumer-market scope, manufacturer, importer and distributor duties, statements of compliance, compliance failures, enforcement powers, and the monetary-penalty maximum.
Sections 4, 5 and 54 establish the relevant-connectable-product and UK-consumer scope tests.
Binding source for the UK scope and actor sequence.
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Primary source for the UK scope, actor, statement, compliance-failure, and enforcement checks.
Technical context for shared consumer IoT controls. The UK duties on this page are grounded in the PSTI Act and Regulations, not in the standard alone.
Supports using consumer IoT controls as technical overlap context.
Sets the duties of relevant persons and authorised representatives.
Binding source for manufacturer, importer, distributor, authorised-representative, statement, investigation, notification, remediation, and record duties.
Paragraphs 1 to 3 treat manufacturer section 9(2) as met for current, unexpired Japan JC-STAR STAR-1 or Singapore Cybersecurity Labelling Scheme labels; read with Act sections 15(5) and 22(3) for importers and distributors.