DORA has applied since 17 January 2025. Scope work should start with a classification record, not a generic cyber checklist. The useful question is whether the legal entity is a DORA , whether an ICT third-party provider is involved, whether the ICT service supports a critical or important function, and whether the evidence must be held at entity, branch, sub-consolidated, or consolidated level.
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Section 1
Classify the entity before classifying the control work
DORA Article 2 lists the covered categories and separately includes ICT third-party service providers. The financial-entity list covers banks, payment and e-money institutions, account information service providers, investment firms, crypto-asset service providers and issuers of asset-referenced tokens, central securities depositories, central counterparties, trading venues, trade repositories, fund managers and management companies, data reporting service providers, insurance and reinsurance undertakings, insurance intermediaries, reinsurance intermediaries and ancillary insurance intermediaries, IORPs, credit rating agencies, administrators of critical benchmarks, crowdfunding service providers, and securitisation repositories.
A scope record should therefore identify the exact authorised entity, its regulated category, its competent-authority perimeter, and any branch or group role. Do not classify a product team, platform, or supplier as in scope until the legal entity using or providing the ICT service has been named.
Article 2, its exclusions, Article 4 proportionality, and Article 16's simplified-framework branch are binding legal tests. The classification record and evidence fields below are practical documentation controls, not a separate legal category or supervisory approval.
Record the legal name, LEI where available, regulated activity, Member State or branch context, and DORA Article 2 category.
Separate financial entities from ICT third-party service providers; DORA uses both categories, but the obligations and evidence flows are different.
For multi-licensed groups, classify each rather than assuming one group answer covers every licence.
Where a group service company provides ICT services internally, treat the intragroup provider as part of the ICT third-party risk map rather than ignoring it.
End each entity review with one explicit outcome: in scope under an Article 2 category; excluded under a stated Article 2(3) or Member State Article 2(4) basis; in scope under the Article 16 simplified framework; or in scope under the general framework with proportionate implementation.
Identify exclusions and proportionality without erasing the record
DORA excludes specific categories from Article 2 scope, including AIFMs referred to in Article 3(2) of the AIFMD, insurance and reinsurance undertakings referred to in Article 4 of Solvency II, IORPs operating schemes with no more than 15 members in total, MiFID-exempt natural or legal persons, insurance intermediaries, reinsurance intermediaries and ancillary insurance intermediaries that are micro, small, or medium-sized enterprises, and post office giro institutions. Member States may also exclude certain CRD Article 2(5) entities located in their territory.
Proportionality is not an exemption from DORA. Article 4 ties implementation to the 's size, overall risk profile, and the nature, scale, and complexity of its services, activities, and operations. Article 16 separately assigns a simplified ICT risk management framework to defined categories, including small and non-interconnected investment firms, certain sectorally exempt payment and electronic money institutions, certain small IORPs, and institutions exempted under Directive 2013/36/EU. The scope record must distinguish an Article 2 exclusion, an Article 16 simplified-framework classification, and ordinary proportionate implementation.
Write the exclusion basis as a legal-entity fact, with the directive or DORA category that creates the exclusion.
For small or simple entities, record the proportionality factors used to scale ICT risk management, incident, testing, and third-party work.
For an Article 16 entity, record the exact qualifying category and map which duties the simplified framework changes; do not label the entity out of scope.
Do not rely on a supplier certificate, internal policy label, or customer segment as a DORA exclusion.
Reassess scope when the entity gains a new licence, opens a branch, changes group structure, or adds ICT services supporting a critical or important function.
Classify ICT services by critical or important function
DORA defines a critical or important function by the consequence of disruption or defective performance: material impairment to the 's performance, soundness, service continuity, authorisation conditions, or other financial-services obligations. Scope analysis should therefore connect each ICT service to the business function it supports and to the consequence of losing that service.
The register-of-information templates make this classification operational. They ask for the function identifier, the using the ICT service, whether the service supports a critical or important function, data location and sensitivity where relevant, reliance level, substitutability, alternatives, and subcontractors that effectively underpin services supporting critical or important functions.
Create one function record per , licensed activity, and function combination where the register template requires unique identification.
Classify reliance as not significant, low, material, or full using the register template logic rather than a free-text label.
Document whether an alternative ICT provider exists and how difficult migration or reintegration would be.
Treat critical or important function classification as a trigger for contract policy, due diligence, monitoring, audit rights, exit planning, and subcontractor visibility.
Map ICT third-party providers, intragroup providers, and subcontractors
DORA defines an ICT third-party service provider as an undertaking providing ICT services and defines ICT services broadly as digital and data services provided through ICT systems on an ongoing basis, excluding traditional analogue telephone services. Intragroup ICT service providers are not outside the analysis; the DORA contract-policy RTS says intragroup providers should be considered ICT third-party service providers for the policy.
For ICT services supporting critical or important functions, the record should show the direct provider, any intragroup links, the ICT service supply chain, and subcontractors that effectively underpin the service. Subcontracting risk does not transfer ultimate responsibility away from the 's management body.
For each arrangement, store the contractual reference number, signing entity, entity making use of the ICT service, provider identifier, service type, function identifier, and provider country or data-location facts where required.
Use LEI or EUID for legal-person ICT providers where the register instructions require those identifiers; third-country legal-person providers use LEI in the register template logic.
Include intragroup links when one group entity signs or provides ICT services for another group entity.
For critical or important functions, identify subcontractors whose disruption would impair security or continuity of service provision.
Decide when provider criticality is a supervisory designation question
A 's DORA scope decision is separate from the EU process for designating critical ICT third-party service providers. A cloud, software, data-centre, managed-security, or other ICT provider may be important to one financial entity even if it has not been designated critical by the ESAs. Conversely, ESA criticality designation is assessed using systemic criteria across financial entities and categories.
Delegated Regulation 2024/1502 specifies a two-step ESA assessment for critical ICT third-party providers. It uses factors such as the share of financial entities using the same ICT services for critical or important functions, systemic character of the financial entities relying on those services, the critical nature of the ICT service, and substitutability or migration difficulty.
Does DORA apply only to banks?
No. DORA Article 2 covers many types, including payment, e-money, investment, crypto-asset, market infrastructure, fund, insurance, pension, rating, benchmark, crowdfunding, and securitisation-repository entities, plus ICT third-party service providers.
Is an ICT supplier automatically a critical ICT third-party provider under DORA?
No. A supplier can support a 's critical or important function without being designated critical by the ESAs. Critical-provider designation is a separate supervisory process based on systemic impact, financial-entity reliance, service criticality, and substitutability.
What evidence proves a DORA scope classification?
Keep the legal-entity classification, regulated activity, branch or group role, Article 2 category or exclusion, function map, ICT service and provider identifiers, contractual reference numbers, critical-or-important-function assessment, reliance level, alternatives assessment, and approval history.
Do not wait for ESA critical-provider designation before registering and managing an ICT provider that supports a critical or important function.
Flag provider concentration where several in-scope entities, licensed activities, or group companies depend on the same provider or same subcontractor.
Use substitutability, migration difficulty, and alternative-provider analysis as scope evidence for both internal resilience planning and register quality.
Keep the provider-criticality record aligned with register data because ESA assessments rely on registers of information and other available information.
Map entities, functions, ICT providers, and register evidence
Sorena can help convert DORA scope questions into cited entity classifications, provider maps, critical-function decisions, and register-ready evidence fields.
This delegated regulation specifies the ESA criteria and two-step assessment for designating ICT third-party service providers as critical for financial entities.
The contract-policy RTS says intragroup ICT service providers and subcontractors are included in the policy for ICT services supporting critical or important functions.
The subcontracting RTS supports the point that subcontracting critical or important ICT services requires risk visibility and does not reduce management-body responsibility.
Article 3 defines critical or important function; Articles 8, 11, 12, and 28 connect ICT dependencies, continuity, and third-party risk to those functions.