Artifact GuideGLOBALFIPS-approved cryptographic algorithm requirements

Post-quantum migration FIPS evidence tracker

Track where ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA affect products, protocols, certificates, and validation evidence without inventing unsupported migration dates or readiness status.

Grounded in NIST FIPS 203, FIPS 204, FIPS 205, CAVP, and CMVP source material.

Author
Sorena AI
Published
May 9, 2026
Updated
May 9, 2026
Sections
6

Structured answer sets in this page tree.

Primary sources
6

Cited legal and guidance references.

Publication metadata
Sorena AI
Published May 9, 2026
Updated May 9, 2026
Overview

Use this tracker to inventory cryptographic uses that may need post-quantum review and to record the evidence that supports each decision. The tracker should identify the algorithm role, FIPS source, parameter set, implementation boundary, CAVP evidence, and CMVP module impact. It should not claim that a product is post-quantum ready, validated, or migrated unless the matching certificate, module boundary, and operational environment evidence exists.

Section 1

Tracker rows should start with the cryptographic role, not a migration status

Begin each row by naming the product, protocol, service, library, firmware image, or cryptographic module boundary where the primitive is used. Then classify the role: key establishment, digital signature generation, signature verification, certificate issuance, firmware signing, code signing, TLS termination, VPN, SSH, KMS, HSM, or embedded device update.

Only after the role is clear should the row map to FIPS 203, FIPS 204, or FIPS 205. FIPS 203 specifies ML-KEM for establishing a shared secret key. FIPS 204 specifies ML-DSA for digital signatures. FIPS 205 specifies SLH-DSA for stateless hash-based digital signatures. A row that only says "PQC" is not specific enough for engineering, procurement, or validation review.

  • Track ML-KEM rows for key-establishment uses, including where the resulting shared secret feeds symmetric encryption, authentication, or a protocol key schedule.
  • Track ML-DSA rows for lattice-based signature generation and verification uses, including whether the implementation uses pure or pre-hash signing where that distinction matters.
  • Track SLH-DSA rows separately because it is stateless hash-based, has SHA2 and SHAKE parameter-set families, and has implementation requirements that differ from ML-DSA.
  • Keep classical RSA, ECDSA, and ECDH rows visible as legacy or coexistence inventory items, but do not describe them as replaced unless the actual design and evidence prove that change.
Section 2

Minimum fields for a useful post-quantum migration tracker

A migration tracker is useful when every row can be checked by an engineer and an evidence reviewer. The row should show what is in scope, which FIPS publication controls the algorithm choice, which parameter set is selected or still undecided, what CAVP or ACVP evidence is expected, and whether the cryptographic module boundary changes.

Avoid current-status labels such as "validated", "complete", "approved", or "available" unless the row also names the certificate, validation entry, module version, operational environment, and source date that support the label. When evidence is missing, use neutral working states such as "inventory only", "design decision needed", "implementation evidence needed", or "certificate evidence needed".

  • Inventory fields: product or service, use case, protocol or API, implementation owner, supplier, cryptographic module boundary, operational environment, and release version.
  • Algorithm fields: classical primitive in use, proposed PQC primitive, FIPS publication, parameter set, pure or pre-hash signature mode where relevant, and approved RBG or hash dependency where relevant.
  • Evidence fields: design record, test plan, CAVP certificate or ACVP test evidence, CMVP certificate impact, approved-mode statement, security policy update, and procurement claim text.
  • Review fields: open question, blocking evidence, customer commitment, exception owner, and the source link used for the row.
  • Example row: "VPN gateway | key establishment | ML-KEM | FIPS 203 | ML-KEM-768 | inventory only | CAVP evidence needed | CMVP boundary review needed".
Section 3

Separate algorithm conformance from module validation

The tracker should keep CAVP and CMVP evidence in different columns. CAVP evidence concerns a validated algorithm implementation, including the algorithm implementation name, version, and tested operational environment. CMVP evidence concerns a validated cryptographic module and its tested operational environment. One does not automatically prove the other.

For FIPS 140-3 validation work, record whether an algorithm implementation was modified when integrated into the module and whether the CAVP operational environment is identical to, or fully included in, the module testing environment. This avoids overstating a standalone algorithm certificate as proof that the shipped module, product, or service is validated.

  • Use one column for CAVP or ACVP evidence: algorithm, implementation name, implementation version, operational environment, certificate or test evidence, and parameter sets.
  • Use a separate column for CMVP impact: module name, module version, certificate number if available, cryptographic boundary, approved mode, security policy impact, and operational environment.
  • For supplier evidence, request the exact module and algorithm certificate details instead of accepting broad phrases such as "uses FIPS algorithms" or "PQC compliant".
  • For customer-facing claims, tie every claim to a specific row and avoid product-wide validation language unless the CMVP certificate and boundary support it.
Section 4

Parameter-set decisions belong in the tracker

Do not leave parameter-set selection hidden in code or vendor notes. FIPS 203 names ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, and ML-KEM-1024. FIPS 204 names ML-DSA parameter sets. FIPS 205 names SLH-DSA SHA2 and SHAKE parameter-set families. The tracker should show the selected set, the reason for the choice, and where the choice is implemented.

A parameter-set row should also record dependent implementation choices. For ML-KEM, record encapsulation, decapsulation, and key-generation coverage. For ML-DSA, record signature generation, verification, key generation, context-string handling, and pure or pre-hash use. For SLH-DSA, record SHA2 or SHAKE family, pure or pre-hash use, approved hash or XOF use for pre-hash signatures, and random-bit-generation evidence for key generation.

  • ML-KEM fields: parameter set, encapsulation API, decapsulation API, key-generation location, implicit-rejection handling evidence, and protocol integration point.
  • ML-DSA fields: parameter set, signature-generation path, verification path, context-string policy, deterministic or hedged implementation where documented, and key-use separation.
  • SLH-DSA fields: SHA2 or SHAKE parameter set, pure or pre-hash mode, approved hash or XOF evidence for pre-hash use, RBG evidence for key generation, and sensitive intermediate-data handling.
  • Change-control fields: implementation version, tested operational environment, supplier library version, module boundary, and whether a changed parameter set forces new CAVP or CMVP evidence.
Section 5

Evidence checks for implementation and validation planning

Use this section as a row review before a migration entry becomes a public claim, procurement answer, or release gate. The question is not whether the row sounds complete; it is whether the row identifies the exact implementation, parameter set, operational environment, boundary, and test evidence.

CMVP implementation guidance includes cryptographic algorithm self-test requirements for post-quantum algorithms. For module validation planning, tracker rows should identify whether ML-KEM, ML-DSA, or SLH-DSA functions are implemented in approved mode and what self-test or known-answer-test evidence is expected. Keep these as planning and evidence fields, not as proof of validation until the relevant certificate or validation record exists.

  • ML-KEM evidence check: key generation, encapsulation, decapsulation, parameter set, implicit-rejection coverage, and shared-secret integration are all named.
  • ML-DSA evidence check: key generation, signature generation, signature verification, context handling, parameter set, and pre-hash or pure path are all named.
  • SLH-DSA evidence check: key generation, signature generation, signature verification, SHA2 or SHAKE parameter family, pure or pre-hash path, and approved hash or XOF dependency are all named.
  • Validation evidence check: CAVP or ACVP evidence is linked separately from CMVP module evidence, and neither is used to make unsupported product-wide claims.
Section 6

Do not turn the tracker into unsupported timeline content

This page should not invent migration deadlines, availability dates, certificate status, or customer readiness. FIPS 203, FIPS 204, and FIPS 205 provide algorithm standards; CAVP and CMVP provide validation evidence paths. The tracker can show what evidence is needed and what has been verified, but each status must come from a visible source or internal evidence record.

When a team needs dates, keep them in evidence-owned records such as release plans, procurement commitments, validation lab schedules, certificate listings, or customer contracts. If those records are not public source material, do not publish the dates here.

  • Use neutral row states such as inventory only, design decision needed, implementation evidence needed, CAVP evidence needed, CMVP impact review needed, or customer-claim review needed.
  • Avoid unsupported claims such as migrated, FIPS validated, quantum safe, CAVP certified, CMVP certified, production ready, or compliant without row-level evidence.
  • Keep public source URLs external, https, and source-specific; do not cite local source reference files, internal spreadsheets, or private validation notes.
  • Review tracker rows after algorithm implementation changes, parameter-set changes, operational-environment changes, cryptographic-boundary changes, supplier changes, or claim-language changes.
Primary sources

References and citations

csrc.nist.gov
Referenced sections
  • Supports checking certificate evidence for algorithm implementations before tracker rows become customer-facing validation claims.
"validation-search"
csrc.nist.gov
Referenced sections
  • Use the public CMVP search to check cryptographic-module certificate evidence and module status before making module validation claims.
"Validated Modules"
csrc.nist.gov
Referenced sections
  • Supports adding self-test planning fields for ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA without implying a certificate already exists.
"Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test Requirements"
doi.org
Referenced sections
  • Supports the ML-KEM algorithm classification used by tracker rows, not an unsupported product migration date.
"Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard"
doi.org
Referenced sections
  • Supports the ML-DSA signature classification used by tracker rows, not an unsupported product readiness status.
"Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard"
doi.org
Referenced sections
  • Supports the SLH-DSA signature classification used by tracker rows, not an unsupported product validation claim.
"Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard"
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