Artifact FAQGLOBALFIPS validation certificates

FIPS validation certificates How to read CAVP and CMVP evidence

Validation certificates are useful only when the certificate type, implementation, version, , and claim scope all match.

This FAQ helps separate CAVP algorithm evidence from CMVP module validation evidence before answering customers, auditors, or procurement teams.

Author
Sorena AI
Published
May 9, 2026
Updated
Oct 15, 2026
Overview

First identify which is being cited. A CAVP certificate supports a claim about a tested cryptographic algorithm implementation. A CMVP certificate and its support a claim about a validated cryptographic module. Neither should be stretched to cover a different implementation, version, , module boundary, or product configuration.

Search this module

Find a question or answer quickly

5 of 5 questions
Question 1

What does each validation certificate prove?

The CMVP implementation guidance draws a clear line between certificate types. CAVP tests and validates cryptographic algorithm implementations; the algorithm states the implementation name, implementation version, and tested .

CMVP tests and validates cryptographic modules. A module states the validated cryptographic module name, version, and tested . That module-level evidence is separate from the algorithm certificate, even when the module uses CAVP-tested algorithms.

  • Use CAVP evidence for the tested algorithm implementation, such as an AES, hash, signature, KDF, MAC, or DRBG implementation.
  • Use CMVP evidence for a FIPS 140-3 cryptographic module claim, including the module boundary, , approved services, status, and caveats.
  • Do not convert a CAVP algorithm certificate into a product-level or module-level FIPS 140-3 validation claim.
Question 2

When does a certificate match a deployed implementation?

A is a benchmark for the configuration and used during validation testing. For an algorithm implementation embedded in a module undergoing FIPS 140-3 testing, the guidance requires the algorithm implementation to remain unmodified and the CAVP-tested operational environment to be identical to, or fully included in, the module testing environment.

For software modules, the operating system, platform, processor, and any hypervisor details are part of the check. A certificate tested on one operating system or processor bit size should not be treated as evidence for another environment unless the official record and module evidence support that environment.

  • Compare the certificate's algorithm implementation name and version with the implementation shipped in the product or module.
  • Compare the certificate's tested operating system, platform, processor, and hypervisor details with the deployed or validated environment.
  • Re-check evidence after code changes, library swaps, processor acceleration changes, operating-system changes, module-boundary changes, or certificate status changes.
Question 3

How should certificate evidence be worded in reviews?

Use wording that names the exact evidence and stops at what it proves. The statement should identify the certificate type, certificate number or listing, vendor, module or implementation name, version, , validation status, and the date the public listing was checked.

For procurement and customer responses, replace broad phrases such as FIPS compliant encryption with narrower wording. For example, state that a named algorithm implementation has a CAVP , or that a named cryptographic module is listed by CMVP for a stated version and environment. Then add any approved-mode instructions, caveats, and deployment conditions that limit the claim.

  • Keep CAVP certificate records with the algorithm implementation, parameters, certificate number, tested environment, and source URL.
  • Keep CMVP certificate records with the module name, version, certificate number, , status, approved-mode instructions, caveats, and source URL.
  • Avoid claims that a whole application, cloud service, or product is FIPS validated unless the cited CMVP certificate and deployment configuration actually support that scope.
Question 4

What do Active, Historical, and Revoked CMVP statuses mean?

Status changes the decision a certificate can support. An Active module may be used for new and existing federal systems when the exact module version, environment, approved services, and caveats match. A Historical certificate has not been revoked, but NIST says federal agencies should not include the module in new systems; legacy use or procurement requires the responsible agency's documented decision.

A Revoked certificate is no longer valid and may not be cited to demonstrate compliance with the FIPS 140 standards. Historical status can result from age, a sunset date, or a program transition, so read the status reason and current certificate page instead of relying on an old certificate image or supplier copy.

  • For a new system, check that the certificate is Active and that its sunset date and transition status fit the acquisition schedule.
  • For a legacy system, record why a Historical module remains in use, which agency or risk owner accepted it, and what replacement or review trigger applies.
  • For a Revoked module, stop using the certificate as validation evidence and determine whether replacement, revalidation, or another validated module is required.
Question 5

Questions and answers

What is the difference between a CAVP certificate and a CMVP certificate?

A CAVP certificate supports a tested cryptographic algorithm implementation, while a CMVP certificate supports a validated cryptographic module. The CMVP guidance says the algorithm certificate states the implementation name, version number, and tested , while the module certificate states the validated module name, version number, and tested operational environment.

Does a cover my deployed product automatically?

No. The certificate is only a benchmark for the configuration and used during validation testing. For software modules, compare the tested operating system, platform, processor, and hypervisor details against the deployed environment before reusing the evidence.

Can I say the whole product is FIPS validated if one algorithm has a certificate?

No. A CAVP algorithm certificate does not by itself prove the product is a FIPS 140-3 validated module. Use the module certificate, , and deployment mapping to show the exact scope of the claim.

Does Historical status mean a CMVP certificate was revoked?

No. Historical status means the certificate or documentation is old or affected by a program transition and should not support a new federal system. It may still be considered for a legacy system under the responsible agency's decision. Revoked status is different: the validation is no longer valid and cannot demonstrate compliance with the FIPS 140 standards.

Primary sources

References and citations

csrc.nist.gov4 citations
Referenced sections
  • Primary official source for distinguishing algorithm validation certificates from module validation certificates and for checking version and operational-environment match.
  • Distinguishes CAVP algorithm validation certificates from CMVP cryptographic module validation certificates.
  • Supports the implementation, version, and operational-environment checks needed before reusing certificate evidence.
Show 1 more
  • Supports certificate-scoped evidence wording and review triggers for implementation and environment changes.
"The validation certificate serves as a benchmark"
More quoted passages
"Cryptographic algorithm implementations are tested and validated under the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program"
"states the name and version number"
csrc.nist.gov3 citations
Referenced sections
  • Public search page for checking CAVP algorithm certificate records.
  • Public search page for checking algorithm validation records before citing a CAVP certificate.
  • Use the public CAVP listing for current algorithm certificate details rather than relying only on copied screenshots.
doi.org3 citations
Referenced sections
  • Primary standard for cryptographic-module security requirements and CMVP validation scope.
  • Defines FIPS 140-3 as the cryptographic-module security requirement set and explains the CMVP validation role.
  • Supports keeping module-validation evidence separate from algorithm-standard or algorithm-certificate evidence.
"Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules"
More quoted passages
"Cryptographic modules that are validated under the CMVP"
csrc.nist.gov2 citations
Referenced sections
  • Official explanation of Active, Historical, and Revoked certificate status and how each status affects new and legacy federal systems.
  • Defines the practical consequences of Active, Historical, and Revoked status for new systems, legacy systems, and compliance claims.
csrc.nist.gov2 citations
Referenced sections
  • Public search page for checking CMVP cryptographic module validation certificate records.
  • Public search page for checking FIPS 140-3 and FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module validation records.
Show all related guides (25)

CAVP Algorithm Validation and ACVP Testing

How CAVP algorithm validation, the ACVP protocol, the ACVTS test system, and CMVP module validation fit together without overstating a FIPS claim.

CAVP Validation Evidence Workflow for FIPS Algorithms

Workflow for collecting CAVP validation evidence and ACVP/ACVTS test records: implementation identity, tested parameters, environments, and CMVP handoff records.

FIPS 180-4 and FIPS 202 secure hash guidance

Choose and evidence SHA-2, SHA-3, and SHAKE use under FIPS 180-4, FIPS 202, CAVP validation, and FIPS 140-3 module claims.

FIPS 186-5 and FIPS 204 digital signatures

Compare FIPS 186-5 classical digital signatures with FIPS 204 ML-DSA, including scope, algorithm choices, key-use limits, and validation evidence boundaries.

FIPS 203 ML-KEM vs RSA and ECDH key establishment

Compare FIPS 203 ML-KEM with RSA and ECDH key-establishment schemes using NIST SP 800-56A, SP 800-56B, CAVP, and CMVP evidence.

FIPS approved algorithm selector workflow

A cited workflow for selecting FIPS and NIST-approved cryptographic algorithms without overstating module validation, CAVP evidence, or approved-mode claims.

FIPS approved mode procurement: certificates, boundaries, and evidence

Procurement guidance for FIPS approved mode claims: how to check CMVP certificates, CAVP evidence, module boundaries, tested environments, and supplier evidence before purchase.

FIPS crypto transition and deprecation tracker

Track FIPS algorithm transitions, withdrawn guidance, CAVP evidence, CMVP module impact, procurement triggers, and approved-mode caveats without overstating validation status.

FIPS cryptographic algorithm selector

Choose between FIPS algorithm standards for AES, SHA-2, SHA-3, digital signatures, ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA without overstating validation scope.

FIPS KDF and MAC coverage for validated modules

Map FIPS 140-3 KDF and MAC coverage to approved security functions, CAVP evidence, self-tests, service indicators, and module security policy entries.

FIPS Key Management Mapping for Algorithms and SSP Evidence

Map FIPS 140-3 key management requirements to approved algorithms, SSP establishment methods, CAVP evidence, module boundaries, and key-use records.

FIPS Procurement Evidence Review Workflow: CAVP, CMVP, Approved Mode

Review FIPS crypto procurement evidence by separating CAVP algorithm certificates from CMVP module certificates, Security Policy scope, approved mode, operating environment, change impact, and retention records.

FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithms FAQ

Answers to common FIPS algorithm questions: approved security functions, CAVP validation, CMVP module scope, AES modes, SHA-2, SHA-3, signatures, and post-quantum algorithms.

ML-DSA vs ECDSA under FIPS 204 and FIPS 186-5

Compare ML-DSA and ECDSA for FIPS-aligned digital signature designs, including parameter choices, key handling, CAVP algorithm evidence, and CMVP module boundaries.

Post-quantum FIPS 203, 204, and 205: ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA

An official source guide to the three NIST post-quantum FIPS standards: when ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA apply, what evidence to keep, and how CAVP and CMVP claims differ.

Post-Quantum Migration for FIPS Cryptography

Plan post-quantum migration for FIPS cryptography by separating ML-KEM key establishment, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA signatures, CAVP algorithm evidence, and CMVP module validation boundaries.

Post-Quantum Migration Tracker for FIPS 203, 204, and 205

Track post-quantum cryptography migration evidence for FIPS 203 ML-KEM, FIPS 204 ML-DSA, FIPS 205 SLH-DSA, CAVP algorithm certificates, and CMVP module boundaries.

SHA-2 vs SHA-3 under FIPS 180-4 and FIPS 202

Compare SHA-2 and SHA-3 for FIPS use: approved functions, validation evidence, compatibility, procurement checks, and when migration is not required.

TLS use-case mapping for FIPS algorithm evidence

Map TLS uses to FIPS algorithm, CAVP, CMVP, approved-mode, certificate-authority, and evidence checks without overstating protocol validation claims.