Artifact GuideGLOBALFIPS-approved cryptographic algorithm requirements

FIPS algorithm evidence CAVP validation workflow

A workflow for proving which algorithm implementations have CAVP evidence, which claims require CMVP module validation, and which product changes require a fresh evidence review.

Use the public NIST validation listing for the algorithm claim, retain ACVP test records as supporting evidence, and use a separate CMVP certificate and Security Policy for a module claim.

Author
Sorena AI
Published
May 9, 2026
Updated
Jul 25, 2026
Sections
6

Structured answer sets in this page tree.

Primary sources
6

Cited legal and guidance references.

Publication metadata
Sorena AI
Published May 9, 2026
Updated Jul 25, 2026
Overview

Start with the public Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program () entry for the exact algorithm implementation, not a supplier statement or raw test transcript. The Automated Cryptographic Validation Protocol () exchanges capabilities, test vectors, responses, and verdicts with NIST's Automated Cryptographic Validation Test System (); neither an ACVP session nor access to ACVTS is a separate validation credential. NIST states that only testing through an accredited laboratory on Production ACVTS can create a certificate on the Algorithm Validation Page. A Demo ACVTS result is engineering evidence only and cannot support a public CAVP certificate claim. A FIPS 140-3 module claim still requires separate Cryptographic Module Validation Program () evidence for the named module, boundary, environment, and approved service.

Section 1

Start with the exact algorithm implementation claim

evidence is useful only when the claim names the implementation being tested. The implementation owner captures the algorithm family, mode, parameter set, implementation name, version, vendor, processor or platform dependency, and the product or module boundary that will rely on the result. The assurance reviewer accepts, limits, or rejects the claim after matching those fields to the public entry.

Keep the claim narrow. NIST source material treats as validation testing for approved cryptographic algorithm implementations, while validates cryptographic modules against FIPS 140-3. A validated AES, SHA-3, deterministic random bit generator (DRBG), key-agreement scheme (KAS), key-transport scheme (KTS), ML-KEM, or signature implementation does not by itself validate the whole module, cloud service, appliance, or software product.

  • Record the algorithm and mode exactly as it appears in the supplier statement or validation listing.
  • Identify whether the evidence is for a standalone implementation, a processor algorithm accelerator, a processor algorithm implementation, a bound or embedded module, or the module under validation.
  • Name the relying use case: approved service, protocol implementation, procurement requirement, customer assurance packet, or submission support.
  • Reject a generic FIPS cryptography claim unless the supplier identifies the public entry for an algorithm claim or the certificate and Security Policy for a module claim.
Section 2

Collect certificate and search evidence

The evidence packet should let a reviewer reproduce the lookup. Save the public validation-search URL or certificate reference, the algorithm name, certificate number or validation identifier, implementation name, vendor name, version details, tested operational environment, and any caveats that appear with the entry.

For procurement or customer responses, attach the source record rather than paraphrasing it. The reviewer should be able to compare the supplier claim against the public listing and see whether the listed implementation is the one used by the delivered product.

  • Capture a dated copy or export of the validation-search result used for the decision.
  • Record certificate numbers and validation identifiers exactly; do not normalize names in a way that breaks lookup.
  • Preserve tested environment details, including processor, operating system, hardware acceleration, or software/firmware notes when the source lists them.
  • Tie each certificate entry to the product bill of materials, cryptographic inventory, or submission table that relies on it.
Section 3

Preserve ACVP test artifacts without exposing private data

An client exchanging data with can produce capability registration, vector, response, and verdict artifacts for engineering and laboratory review. NIST offers a Demo ACVTS server for interested users, but only an accredited laboratory using Production ACVTS can create a listed algorithm validation certificate. Record the environment used before treating a passed session as anything more than test evidence, and label Demo results, failed sessions, superseded vectors, and laboratory drafts so they cannot be mistaken for a public Production ACVTS outcome.

Keep sensitive session records in access-controlled evidence storage and use the public entry for external validation claims. An internal record should identify the submitter, implementation, parameter set, test environment, vector set or session, verdict, corrected failures, laboratory, and resulting public validation entry. If no public entry resulted, record a test result or validation gap, not a certificate.

  • Store registration options, capabilities, vector-set IDs, response files, verdicts, and lab correspondence in access-controlled evidence storage.
  • Do not place production keys or other production secrets in validation-test records. Remove unreleased implementation details and lab-only correspondence before creating public assurance material.
  • Link a Production result to the resulting public entry. Label a Demo result or a session that produced no public entry as supporting test evidence or a validation gap.
  • Mark Demo results explicitly; they cannot create certificates on NIST's Algorithm Validation Page.
  • For algorithms such as ML-KEM, keep test-only interfaces and production interfaces distinct because NIST specifies test interfaces that should not be exposed to applications.
Section 4

Build the CAVP to CMVP handoff record

When the evidence supports a FIPS 140-3 module validation, translate the entry into the module submission context. The handoff should state which module service uses the algorithm, whether the service is claimed as approved, which Security Policy table or submission field cites the certificate, and whether the module boundary matches the implementation evidence.

FIPS 140-3 requires conforming modules to employ approved security functions, and guidance ties -tested functions to the module validation record. The handoff does not replace the CMVP certificate, Security Policy, operational environment, service indicator, or validation status needed for the module claim.

  • Map certificate entries to Security Policy algorithm tables, approved-service descriptions, self-test coverage, and service-indicator behavior.
  • Document whether the implementation is inside the module boundary, provided by an embedded validated module, or called through a bound module.
  • For embedded or bound modules, identify the existing validated module by name, certificate number, version, and used functionality.
  • Keep evidence and evidence in separate fields so reviewers can tell which claim each source supports.
Section 5

Use change triggers before reusing old evidence

Do not reuse evidence merely because an algorithm name still matches. Re-check the listed implementation, version, operational environment, algorithms, modes, and parameters when the implementation, compiler or build, processor acceleration, platform, module boundary, parameter set, mode, or dependent module changes. A change is a review trigger; its effect depends on the certificate, current program guidance, and the claim being made.

Bound or embedded module claims need an additional status check. guidance requires the external validated module to be Active when the module under test is submitted to CMVP, and the downstream validation can later inherit Historical status. Those submission rules do not turn every product update into an automatic revocation, so record the change and obtain laboratory or CMVP guidance when the effect is unclear.

  • Trigger review after implementation rewrites, library upgrades, compiler or build changes, hardware acceleration changes, operating-system changes, or platform-porting changes.
  • Trigger review when an algorithm transition, caveat, or status change affects a certificate that the product relies on.
  • For bound or embedded modules, verify that the existing validated module was Active at the applicable submission point and that the reused functionality still matches the certificate and Security Policy.
  • Record the decision as reuse accepted, evidence update required, revalidation impact, or customer claim removed.
Section 6

Acceptance checklist for the evidence packet

Review this checklist before relying on evidence in a release gate, supplier review, audit response, or submission. Each item should be answerable from the evidence packet without requiring the reviewer to infer facts from marketing copy. Accept only the matched algorithm implementation and environment; limit the claim when the record covers fewer modes, parameters, or operations than the product exposes; reject it when the implementation, environment, certificate, or public status does not match; and open a gap record when evidence is still pending.

  • The packet names the algorithm, mode or parameter set, implementation, vendor, version, tested environment, and certificate or validation identifier.
  • The packet links to stable external NIST sources and contains no private lab artifacts.
  • The packet states whether the claim is algorithm validation, test evidence, module validation, or procurement assurance.
  • The packet maps each entry to the product, module service, Security Policy table, approved service indicator, or customer requirement that uses it.
  • The decision records one outcome: accepted as algorithm evidence, accepted as supporting test evidence only, escalated for or laboratory review, or rejected because the public record does not match.
  • The packet lists unresolved gaps, including missing certificates, mismatched implementation names, unsupported operating environments, Historical or Revoked module status, Demo-only test results, or evidence that cannot be published.
Primary sources

References and citations

csrc.nist.gov
Referenced sections
  • Supports review of operational-environment changes, processor accelerators, algorithm transitions, and the Active-status rule for an external validated module at the time of the downstream module's CMVP submission.
csrc.nist.gov
Referenced sections
  • Official NIST source for ACVTS environments and ACVP use in CAVP algorithm validation workflows.
"Automated Cryptographic Validation Protocol"
csrc.nist.gov
Referenced sections
  • Source for reproducing the public CAVP lookup used in the acceptance decision.
csrc.nist.gov
Referenced sections
  • States that Demo ACVTS is available for testing, while Production ACVTS is restricted to accredited laboratories and is the only route to listed algorithm validation certificates.
"the only way to create algorithm validation certificates"
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