- Official NIST example values page for supported standards.
References and citations
- Primary source for ML-KEM and its parameter sets.
- Primary source for ML-DSA.
- Primary source for SLH-DSA.
PQC adoption is a systems project: inventory, protocols, interoperability, evidence, and long-lived verification.
This page focuses on practical migration patterns grounded in the final 13 August 2024 FIPS releases.
Structured answer sets in this page tree.
Cited legal and guidance references.
FIPS 203, FIPS 204, and FIPS 205 were all published on 13 August 2024. FIPS 203 specifies ML-KEM for post-quantum key establishment. FIPS 204 specifies ML-DSA for post-quantum digital signatures. FIPS 205 specifies SLH-DSA for stateless hash-based digital signatures. The migration challenge is not just picking a new primitive. It is building crypto agility so systems can support new algorithm identifiers, parameter sets, and verification rules without breaking interoperability or long-term trust.
FIPS 203 covers ML-KEM, a key-encapsulation mechanism used to establish a shared secret that other symmetric algorithms can then protect. It defines three parameter sets: ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, and ML-KEM-1024.
FIPS 204 and FIPS 205 cover signatures, but with different constructions. ML-DSA is module-lattice based. SLH-DSA is stateless hash based. They solve related problems with different tradeoffs in size, performance, and operational complexity.
Start with an inventory. Find every place public-key cryptography appears: TLS, device identity, firmware signing, code signing, document signing, certificate profiles, tokens, and hardware-backed stores.
Then build crypto agility. The system should make algorithm identifiers, parameter sets, negotiation rules, and verification behavior explicit and testable. Only after that should you decide where hybrid deployments are necessary.
PQC projects rarely fail because the primitive is mathematically unsound. They fail because systems assume legacy key sizes, signature sizes, field lengths, or verifier behavior.
The right time to find those assumptions is before rollout.
Security teams and procurement reviewers will want to know what you chose, where you deployed it, how you prevent downgrade, and how you plan to maintain it. Build that evidence as an engineering output.
A strong evidence pack for PQC looks like a governed migration program, not a one-off library swap.
Research Copilot can take FIPS Crypto Algorithms Post-quantum cryptography from getting cited answers and faster research on this topic to a reusable workflow inside Sorena. Teams working on FIPS Crypto Algorithms can keep owners, evidence, and next steps aligned without copying this guide into separate documents.
Start from FIPS Crypto Algorithms Post-quantum cryptography and answer scope, timing, and interpretation questions with cited outputs.
Review your current process, evidence gaps, and next steps for FIPS Crypto Algorithms Post-quantum cryptography.