Artifact GuideEU

eIDAS Article 5b EUDI Wallet relying party registration

This page helps scope what a public or private service must prepare before it relies on the European Digital Identity Wallet in a digital interaction.

Based on the consolidated eIDAS text and the EUDI Wallet Architecture and Reference Framework, with clear limits where Member State registration procedures are still needed.

Author
Sorena AI
Published
May 9, 2026
Updated
Jul 25, 2026
Sections
7

Structured answer sets in this page tree.

Primary sources
5

Cited legal and guidance references.

Publication metadata
Sorena AI
Published May 9, 2026
Updated Jul 25, 2026
Overview

A is the public or private service that asks a user to present person identification data or electronic attestations of attributes from a European Digital Identity Wallet. Under eIDAS Article 5b, a relying party that intends to rely on EUDI Wallets for public or private services by digital interaction must register in the Member State where it is established. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/848 supplies harmonised registration rules that apply from 24 December 2026; the registration records who the relying party is, how it can be contacted, the intended wallet use, and the data it plans to request from users.

Section 1

What Article 5b requires before a service relies on the EUDI Wallet

Article 5b makes registration the entry point for wallet relying parties. The relying party must register in its Member State of establishment before relying on EUDI Wallets for a public or private service delivered through digital interaction.

The minimum registration package is specific. It must include information needed for authentication to EUDI Wallets, including the Member State of establishment, the relying party name, any official registration number and the official-record identification data, contact details, the intended use of the wallet, and an indication of the data the relying party will request from users.

  • Register in the Member State where the relying party is established, not in an arbitrary customer market.
  • Use the Member State's published registration policy to identify required identity, business-registration, entitlement, representation, and redress evidence; EU law does not create one universal application form.
  • Describe each intended wallet use in enough detail to explain why the requested attributes are needed.
  • List the data to be requested from users; Article 5b says relying parties must not request data beyond what they indicated.
  • Keep change control ready, because registered relying parties must inform Member States without delay about changes to their registration information.
  • Do not treat registration as a substitute for sector-specific law; Article 5b preserves applicable Union and national rules for specific services.
Section 2

Registration status, suspension, cancellation, and retention

From 24 December 2026, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/848 requires the relying party to ensure that registration information is accurate when submitted and to update it without undue delay. A registrar may suspend or cancel a registration after a proportionality assessment when information is inaccurate, outdated, or misleading, when the relying party breaches the registration policy, requests more attributes than it registered, or otherwise breaches applicable Union or national law in its wallet role. Depending on that assessment, the registrar may act with or without prior notice.

After suspension or cancellation, the registrar must notify the relevant access-certificate and registration-certificate providers and the affected relying party without undue delay and no later than 24 hours after the decision. Certificate providers must then revoke the affected access and registration certificates without undue delay where applicable.

The 10-year retention duty in the implementing regulation applies to registrars, which must keep the information supplied by registered wallet-relying parties for monitoring, law-enforcement investigations, and dispute handling. It is not a general instruction for relying parties to retain every wallet transaction or presented attribute for 10 years.

  • Assign an owner to monitor registered identity, contact, entitlement, intended-use, attribute, intermediary, and certificate information for changes.
  • Treat suspension or cancellation as a stop condition for new wallet requests. Define how the service will notify operations, confirm certificate revocation, block affected instances, and offer any lawful fallback route.
  • Keep the registration application, registrar response, later updates, and status decisions according to the organisation's applicable legal and records schedule; do not copy the registrar's 10-year duty onto wallet transaction data.
  • Separate registration retention from GDPR storage limits for attributes received from users and from any sector-specific recordkeeping rule.
Section 3

How intended uses and attribute requests should be structured

The ARF treats intended use as a practical boundary for attribute requests. During registration, a relying party records which attributes it intends to request from wallet units for each service or intended use. If one organisation has materially different wallet uses, the ARF explains that a single relying party may register multiple times and may receive more than one .

A single intended use can cover multiple attributes from multiple attestations, but the request should remain coherent for that use. If a relying party has multiple intended uses in one user journey, the ARF says it needs multiple presentation requests, each tied to the relevant intended use.

  • Create one intended-use record per service purpose that needs a distinct set of wallet attributes.
  • For each intended use, record the attribute name, source attestation type, reason it is needed, and whether the service can work with a less identifying attribute.
  • Separate age proof, address proof, professional status, legal-entity representation, and payment or account onboarding use cases when they request different attribute sets.
  • Make the user-facing intended-use description match the registration record and the presentation request.
  • Record why pseudonyms are or are not accepted; Article 5b says relying parties must not refuse pseudonyms where user identification is not required by Union or national law.
Section 4

Provider onboarding, certificates, and what the wallet checks

The ARF describes two preconditions before relying party authentication starts: the relying party registers and obtains an for each relying party instance, and the wallet unit obtains the trust anchor of the access certificate authority from the relevant list of trusted entities. In each presentation, the relying party instance includes its access certificate and trust chain, signs request data, and the wallet unit verifies the signature, certificate chain, and revocation status before asking the user for approval.

Registration certificates are a separate concept. Under the harmonised rules applying from 24 December 2026, Member States must ensure that they are issued automatically and without undue delay after registration. A can list the attributes registered for a particular intended use, allowing the wallet to compare the requested attributes against what the relying party registered.

  • Inventory every relying party instance that will send wallet presentation requests and bind it to the correct .
  • Keep certificate issuance, trust-chain, revocation-check, and key-rotation evidence with the service onboarding record.
  • For registrations under the harmonised rules applying from 24 December 2026, distribute the correct to each relying party instance for the relevant intended use.
  • For a pre-harmonised implementation in which no is available, preserve the registrar URL, relying party identifier, and intended-use identifier needed for wallet verification.
  • For intermediaries, evidence must distinguish the intermediary's own from the intermediated relying party's registered intended use.
Section 5

User approval, privacy notices, and request evidence

The ARF is explicit that user approval in the wallet means the user's decision to present attributes; it should not be treated as the relying party's lawful basis for processing personal data. The relying party still needs its own GDPR analysis for the requested attributes.

Before attributes are presented, the wallet informs the user about the relying party identity, any intermediary, the requested attributes, the relying party's intended use and privacy policy, and the outcome of checks against registered attributes or embedded disclosure policies where those checks are performed.

  • Keep a privacy-policy URL aligned with each intended use, because the ARF expects this information to be shown to the user through the wallet flow.
  • Store the presentation-request profile: relying party identifier, intended-use identifier, requested attributes, user-friendly intended-use description, and privacy-policy URL.
  • Log whether the request used a or relied on registrar lookup, without storing more wallet transaction content than necessary.
  • Design rejection and fallback paths for cases where the wallet warns that requested attributes were not registered or registration information could not be retrieved.
  • For received attributes, define when unique fixed elements from attestations are no longer needed and should be discarded to reduce relying party linkability risk.
Section 6

What cannot be specified from EU-level sources alone

The EU-level sources do not give one universal public form, fee schedule, portal, evidence pack, or approval service-level agreement for every Member State relying party registration. Article 5b says the relying party registers in its Member State of establishment and that Member States make registration information public online in electronically signed or sealed machine-processable form.

For implementation, treat Member State procedure as a separate source gap until the relevant national registrar, registration portal, authority, or supervisory body has been identified from country-specific material.

  • Do not publish a launch checklist that assumes a single EU portal unless the relevant Member State source confirms it.
  • Before the harmonised rules apply on 24 December 2026, do not assume registration certificates are always issued; the ARF describes registrar lookup when no certificate is available. From that date, the amended binding rules require automatic issuance without undue delay after registration.
  • Do not state national fees, penalties, processing times, or evidentiary attachments without Member State-specific sources.
  • Do not merge multiple legal entities under one registration unless the national registration process and official-record identifiers support that treatment.
  • Do not let an intermediary model hide the relying party; the ARF expects the wallet to display both intermediary and intermediated relying party information where applicable.
Section 7

Evidence checklist for a relying party registration file

A useful relying party file should let legal, product, engineering, privacy, and security reviewers see the same facts: who is registering, what service will use the wallet, which attributes are requested, how the wallet will authenticate the relying party, and what the user will see before approving presentation.

Keep the file scoped to the establishment Member State and update it whenever the registered information changes.

Does eIDAS require every EUDI to register before using the wallet?

Article 5b applies where a relying party intends to rely on EUDI Wallets for public or private services by means of digital interaction. In that case, the relying party must register in the Member State where it is established.

Can a relying party request wallet attributes that were not listed in its registration?

No. Article 5b says relying parties must not request users to provide data other than the data indicated in the registered intended use information.

Does wallet user approval replace a GDPR lawful basis for processing attributes?

No. The ARF states that wallet user approval means the user's decision to present attributes and should not be construed as the relying party's lawful grounds for processing personal data.

  • Legal entity details: Member State of establishment, official name, official registration number where applicable, and official-record identification data.
  • Relying party contacts: operational, privacy, security, and incident channels, plus any privacy-related web form, email address, or phone number used in wallet flows.
  • Intended-use register: service name, user-friendly purpose text, requested attributes, attestation sources, privacy-policy URL, and pseudonym acceptance analysis.
  • Technical onboarding record: relying party instance identifiers, access certificates, trust-chain validation evidence, revocation-check approach, and key-management owner.
  • Registration verification record: details under the harmonised rules, or, for a pre-harmonised implementation without a certificate, registrar lookup fields such as registrar URL, relying party identifier, and intended-use identifier.
  • Change record: what changed, when the Member State was informed, which presentation requests or certificates were updated, and when the user-facing description was checked.
Primary sources

References and citations

eu-digital-identity-wallet.github.io
Referenced sections
  • The ARF supports the evidence fields for relying party instances, access certificates, registration certificates, registrar lookup, intended-use descriptions, and privacy-policy URLs.
"a User-friendly description of the Relying Party's intended use"
digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu
Referenced sections
  • Commission publication page identifying the ARF as the specifications framework for interoperable EUDI Wallet solutions.
"specifications needed to develop an interoperable European Digital Identity"
eur-lex.europa.eu
Referenced sections
  • Article 5b supports the evidence fields for legal identity, contacts, intended use, requested data, change updates, and relying-party validation responsibility.
"contact details of the relying party"
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