A step by step incident response playbook aligned to the ISO/IEC 27035 series.
Built for speed, decision clarity, evidence quality, and clean handoffs between management and technical responders.
Structured answer sets in this page tree.
Cited legal and guidance references.
The ISO/IEC 27035 series expects incident response to be run through structured intake, assessment, response operations, and learning. This playbook translates that into a usable operating sequence with defined forms, roles, escalation points, and evidence requirements.
Part 2 makes planning and preparation a first class activity. That means the playbook should already name the IMT, IRT, incident coordinator, point of contact, external support paths, and approval authorities before the first event arrives.
If these choices are made during the incident, the response is already behind.
Assessment Autopilot can take ISO 27035 Incident Response Playbook from operationalizing response workflows and review cycles to a reusable workflow inside Sorena. Teams working on ISO 27035 can keep owners, evidence, and next steps aligned without copying this guide into separate documents.
Start from ISO 27035 Incident Response Playbook and turn the guidance into owned tasks, evidence requests, and review checkpoints.
Review your current process, evidence gaps, and next steps for ISO 27035 Incident Response Playbook.
Part 2 expects an event report form and criteria for accepting a report based on completeness. Reports should be completed immediately when a suspected event may cause substantial loss or damage to the organization.
The goal is not a perfect report. The goal is a report that is complete enough to support routing and early assessment.
Part 1 and Part 2 both expect organizations to decide whether an event is an incident and to do so within predetermined time frames. The incident coordinator should use the classification scale, affected service context, and severity logic to set the response path.
This decision should be logged, not inferred later from chat history.
Part 3 provides operational guidance for triage and analysis. The objective is to verify scope, understand what happened, and preserve evidence and analysis results in a way that supports later investigation and recovery.
Analysis depth should match the incident severity and the need for containment speed.
Containment is about preventing the incident from growing while protecting recovery options and investigation quality. Part 3 specifically distinguishes containment from eradication and recovery, which matters because each phase has different tradeoffs.
Containment decisions should be explicit, because the fastest action is not always the best action.
Eradication removes the root cause or the active foothold. Recovery restores normal operation safely. Part 3 expects these to be treated as separate operational concerns.
Do not declare recovery complete until integrity and service objectives have been checked.
Part 2 expects rules and circumstances for internal and external information sharing. It also points to the need for legal review and for recognized information marking approaches such as traffic light protocol if your organization adopts them.
Communications should be consistent with the classification policy and should not rely on improvised executive updates.
Part 2 expects lessons learned, IMT evaluation, plan improvement, control improvement, and risk review where incident reality differs from prior assumptions. Closure should therefore produce more than a closed ticket status.
The post-incident phase is where the incident becomes useful to the organization.