- Primary ISO listing for the current ISO/IEC 27001 ISMS requirements standard.
"Information security management systems - Requirements"
This practical guide shows how to approve residual risk under ISO/IEC 27005, from intake through evidence capture and review gates.
Applied to this decision area, the page focuses on scope, ownership, acceptance criteria, evidence, review triggers, and escalation criteria supported by source-linked risk-management guidance.
Structured answer sets in this page tree.
Cited legal and guidance references.
This practical guide explains how to approve residual risk under ISO/IEC 27005, including who should approve it, what evidence is needed, and when the decision should be reviewed.
For this risk-management workflow, keep the traceability chain explicit: scope, risk context, treatment decision, owner, evidence, acceptance criteria, and management review outcome.
The approval decision is whether the remaining risk is within the organization-defined risk tolerance and whether the evidence is complete enough to support an accountable acceptance. If residual risk is outside tolerance, or if required evidence is missing, the workflow should escalate rather than close.
ISO/IEC 27005 is useful when it turns broad intent into repeatable work: make information security risk decisions consistent, explainable, comparable, and usable by risk owners and control owners. The page should therefore end in ownership, acceptance criteria, evidence, and review cadence, not only a definition.
Define owner, evidence requirements, evidence requests, and the next review date before approval.
Convert ISO/IEC 27005 Residual Risk Approval Workflow into accountable tasks, evidence requests, and review checkpoints.
Review your current scope, evidence gaps, and next implementation steps.
Evidence should be collected where the work actually happens. For ISO/IEC 27005, that usually means risk criteria, scenario library, asset and threat assumptions, likelihood and impact rationale, inherent and residual ratings, treatment decisions, approvals, review dates, and control links.
A strong evidence set tells a visitor, auditor, customer, or decision owner what was decided, why it was reasonable, who approved it, and when it must be reviewed again.
Build the workflow around a small number of durable checkpoints: intake, classification, owner assignment, evidence request, decision, review, and escalation. This keeps the work usable across audits, customer assurance, and operational reviews.
Avoid overfitting the workflow to one audit cycle. The same record should help during normal operations, change review, incident response, supplier review, or management review depending on the topic.
When implementation documentation is not tied to a real owner, system, supplier, recovery target, control sample, risk decision, and operations context, it can appear complete but leaves no defensible evidence when reviewed.
Another failure is mixing standards and regulations without stating which source creates the requirement. Use ISO standards to structure management-system practice, and use legal sources separately when a binding obligation applies.
Review should happen when assets, threats, suppliers, business processes, controls, or risk appetite change and at planned risk review intervals. If the review changes the decision, update the register, workflow, control evidence, or contract record that downstream teams rely on.
Improvement is strongest when the same evidence supports multiple needs: certification audits, customer assurance, regulatory mapping, supplier governance, incident reviews, and management review.
"Information security management systems - Requirements"
"Guidance on managing information security risks"
"Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments"