A practical evidence workflow for trust service providers that use subcontractors, outsourcers, suppliers, cloud providers, or trust service component providers.
Based on ETSI EN 319 401 V3.1.1 clauses on policies, supplier relationships, records, and supply-chain responsibility. Use it as implementation guidance and validate it against the applicable service policy, assessment scheme, contracts, and law.
Use this workflow when another party provides part of a trust service or supplies a product, ICT service, cloud service, or that supports it. ETSI EN 319 401 V3.1.1 distinguishes general supplier risk controls from the additional agreement and retained-responsibility duties that apply to , outsourcing, and other third-party service arrangements. Classify the relationship first, then collect the matching evidence.
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Section 1
When does subcontractor evidence become in scope?
First classify what the other party provides. Clauses 7.14.1 and 7.14.2 address products and services supplied to the TSP, including the ICT supply chain and cloud services. Clause 7.14.3 adds duties when service provision involves , outsourcing, another third-party arrangement, or a supplied by another party.
When another party provides part of the TSP's service, REQ-7.14.3-01X keeps overall responsibility with the TSP for conformance with its supply chain policy, information security policy, and applicable requirements. The contract may allocate tasks and liability, but it does not transfer that stated responsibility.
Use a branch record rather than one supplier label. An ordinary product or service supplier follows the acquisition and supplier-risk controls. An ICT or cloud dependency also follows ICT supply-chain, cloud-risk, component, and downstream requirement controls where applicable. A party providing part of the trust service also needs the clause 7.14.3 responsibility, agreement, monitoring, and register evidence. A separately provided needs interface and policy-conformance evidence as well.
Name the supplied product, service, component, or cloud service and explain how it supports the trust service.
Record whether the relationship is an ordinary supplier acquisition, a direct service provider, , outsourcing, another third-party arrangement, or use of a . More than one category may apply.
Map the relationship to the TSP supply chain policy, information security policy, , and practice statement.
Keep the scope narrow enough that evidence can show which party is responsible for each required control.
Record a supported or excluded outcome for each branch and cite the fact behind it. Reclassify the relationship if the supplier starts operating a service component, gains access to TSP information, moves information to a new location, adds a downstream provider, or takes on part of the service.
Before relying on a supplier or subcontractor, show how the selection and contracting decision applied EN 319 401 criteria. The record should address the supplier's ability to meet the TSP's cybersecurity specifications and the risk and classification levels of what is being delivered.
For , outsourcing, or another third-party service arrangement, keep the documented agreement and contractual relationship that makes both parties' information security obligations clear. Also record the outsourcer's liability, controls required by the TSP, and the controls required when use starts and ends. Do not present an internal preference as a standards duty unless it maps to a requirement.
The approval record should identify the supported service, information and asset classification, critical components, locations where TSP information is managed or archived, downstream providers, control owner, evidence-review method, incident contact, change-notice route, commencement conditions, exit conditions, and residual gaps accepted by the TSP.
Selection record: criteria used to select and contract the supplier or service provider, including cybersecurity requirements and risk/classification fit.
Risk record: supplier risk assessment input, including any coordinated security risk assessment for a critical supply chain.
Contract evidence: documented agreement, liability allocation, required TSP controls, and supplier obligations for information security.
Start and exit controls: evidence of controls required before use begins and controls required when supplier products or services are terminated.
Operational evidence should show that supplier controls continue after onboarding. EN 319 401 requires monitoring, review, evaluation, and change management for supplier information security practices and service delivery, including planned reviews and review after incidents related to supplier-provided services.
For ICT suppliers, the workflow should also preserve evidence that security requirements are propagated through subcontracted ICT services, that supplier product or service components critical to functionality are identified, and that the TSP has acceptable methods for validating that ICT products and services conform to stated cybersecurity requirements.
Monitoring evidence: review logs, supplier service review minutes, change records, and incident-triggered supplier reassessments.
SLA or audit mechanism: service agreements shall include service level agreements and/or auditing mechanisms that address the TSP's security requirements in line with its risk assessment.
ICT supply-chain evidence: downstream security requirement propagation, software component information, implemented security functions, secure configuration information, and critical component records where applicable.
Component evidence: when another party provides a , show that the interface meets the component provider's requirements and that the component's security and functionality meet the applicable policy and practices.
: maintain, validate, and update the register of suppliers and agreements so it tracks where TSP information is managed or archived.
This workflow is the operating table for a subcontractor evidence pack: Step | Owner | Evidence | Decision.
1 | Service owner | Supplier scope note, supported trust service, and component/service description | Does this relationship provide or support part of the TSP service?
2 | Procurement and security | Selection criteria, risk/classification fit, and supplier due-diligence record | Can the supplier meet the TSP's cybersecurity specifications and risk requirements?
3 | Legal and control owner | Agreement, liability terms, required controls, SLA or auditing mechanism, and start/exit controls | Are both parties' information security obligations clear enough to rely on?
4 | Operations and assurance | Monitoring reviews, change records, incident-triggered reassessments, updates, and retained operational records | Is the supplier evidence still valid for the current service boundary?
5. Change or exit | Service, security, and records owners | termination approval, access and asset actions, information-location update, evidence handover, register update, and replacement or continuity decision | Can the TSP end or change the relationship without losing service control or required evidence?
Attach requirement identifiers to each row so reviewers can see why the evidence exists.
Separate direct EN 319 401 duties from internal procurement preferences or customer-specific clauses.
A requirement identifier ending in X marks a requirement added, changed, renumbered, or moved since V2.3.1. It does not make the requirement optional.
Keep sensitive supplier details out of public-facing summaries while preserving the underlying evidence for assessors and authorized reviewers.
Do not close the relationship until the , practice-statement obligations, access and asset records, information locations, retained evidence, and continuity or replacement plans reflect the change.
Retain the supplier file within the TSP's broader record model. EN 319 401 requires relevant information concerning data issued and received by the TSP to remain accessible for an appropriate period, including after the TSP's activities have ceased, for legal evidence and continuity purposes.
Review checkpoints should therefore cover both supplier relationship evidence and operational service evidence. The evidence pack is weak if it only contains the original contract and omits updated supplier reviews, incident follow-up, validation, or records showing where TSP information is managed or archived.
Retain current and archived operation records with confidentiality and integrity controls.
Make the retention period consistent with the TSP's terms and conditions where EN 319 401 requires notification of retained service records.
Review and validate supplier agreements at planned intervals so they remain valid, fit for purpose, and include relevant information security clauses.
Use incidents related to supplier-provided services as explicit triggers to review supplier cybersecurity practices and service delivery.
Trigger reassessment after a material service, component, location, ownership, downstream provider, information-handling, security-practice, agreement, incident, or termination change. Record whether the relationship category and evidence boundary changed.
Common gaps are concrete: the supplier is named but the service boundary is not; the contract exists but the required security controls are not traceable; the exists but does not show where TSP information is managed or archived.
Before presenting the pack to a customer, assessor, or governance forum, remove unsupported claims. EN 319 401 requires evidence for responsibility, agreements, monitoring, registers, and records. The contract and workflow do not prove that a supplier, service, or TSP conforms without implementation and assessment evidence.
Are all suppliers subcontractors under EN 319 401?
No. Clauses 7.14.1 and 7.14.2 apply broadly to supplied products and services, including ICT and cloud services. Clause 7.14.3 addresses responsibility and agreements when service provision involves , outsourcing, other third-party arrangements, direct suppliers or service providers, or a separately provided . Record which relationship and requirements apply instead of using the labels interchangeably.
Can a TSP transfer EN 319 401 responsibility to an outsourcer?
Not for the responsibility stated in REQ-7.14.3-01X. When another party provides part of the service, the TSP retains overall responsibility for conformance with its supply chain policy, information security policy, and applicable requirements. The agreement should allocate controls and liability clearly, but it does not erase the TSP's stated responsibility.
Do not claim EN 319 401 conformity from a contract alone; retain the operational records and review evidence behind the controls.
Do not treat a cloud provider or ICT supplier as out of scope when its products or services support the trust service boundary.
Do not omit downstream ICT where EN 319 401 requires supplier security requirements to propagate through the supply chain.
Do not reuse a supplier approval after a service, location, security practice, incident, or agreement change without checking whether reassessment is needed.
REQ-6.1-04 requires the practice statement to identify external-organization obligations; clauses 7.14.1 through 7.14.3 distinguish supplier, ICT supply-chain, cloud, component, and outsourced-service controls and retain stated responsibility with the TSP.
Clauses 3.4, 6.1, 7.10, and 7.14 ground the workflow, explain the X change indicator, and connect external-party obligations, supplier agreements, monitoring, registers, and retained records.
REQ-7.10-01 and REQ-7.10-07 cover accessible records and disclosed retention; REQ-7.14.3-10X through REQ-7.14.3-12X cover incident-triggered reviews and supplier-register validation.
REQ-7.14-04X and REQ-7.14.3-02X through REQ-7.14.3-04X cover selection criteria, documented agreements, outsourcer liability, required controls, and commencement and termination controls.
Clauses 7.14.2 and 7.14.3 support the gap checks for supplier monitoring, cloud-service risk policy, downstream security requirements, component controls, and supplier-register maintenance.